Iraq destined for chaos as country aligns more fully with Iran

Hopes and dreams across the world for a stable Iraq were dashed by a statement put out by the Iraqi government of refusal of compliance with Iranian sanctions.

The response from the United States is likely to be severe. This is likely to include sanctions being put on Iraq and, in the long term, may result in regime change in Iraq to benefit the United States and her regional allies.

What is certain, however, is the systemic corruption in Iraq is only set to continue, and Iran will continue to be blamed for it by the Iraqi people.

It is entirely possible that the United States will, under these circumstances, withdraw from Iraq completely and allow ISIS to rise again. It is entirely possible, too, that should ISIS again march on Baghdad, President Trump will not ally his government at all with the Iraqi government but rather ally with the Kurds and other Iraqi groups and let the corrupt Baghdad government fall.

Meaning: the US may allow ISIS to march on Baghdad to rid the country of Iranian influence.

In this scenario, Iran has the most to lose. America has already been largely forced out of Iraq, and the majority of the Iraqi people see the Americans as more of a stabilizing force than Iran. The Iranians, however, are viewed as occupiers, as the instigators of most of their woes and their troubles. This is shown by recent protests in Basra in particular.

This is a last-ditch effort by Iran to stop the United States from putting it under unilateral pressure. Iran has no desire to stop exporting its destabilizing ideology. Though Iran is not responsible for the creation of ISIS or Al-Qaeda, it is responsible for causing US allies to fund Al-Qaeda and ISIS as protection from Iran's ever-expanding influence. This happened, respectively, after the Iranian revolution and after the downfall of Saddam's government.

If the United States allows Iraq to remain this friendly towards Iran after being given so many other options - including reincorporation into the Arab world - then the Arabian Gulf will explode like a powder keg. Either way, the United States will be unable to maintain the status quo for long and, unfortunately for Iraq, it is better to let Iraq implode than the Arabian Gulf.

Iraqi parliament elects new speaker

Mohammed Al-Halbousi, previous governor of Anbar and 37 years old, has just been elected by the Iraqi parliament as the new speaker.

He was firstly chosen by the Sunni Arab coalition as their ideal candidate, but during the vote in parliament he was staunchly backed by the pro-Iranian factions within parliament.

https://www.france24.com/en/20180915-iraq-parliament-elects-pro-iran-list-candidate-speaker-0

The incumbent Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi has been weakened considerably following the protests in Basra against corruption, Iran and the Islamic Dawa party. Days later, the US-backed Prime Minister conceded that he is no longer seeking a second term. As a result, it seems the Saeroon coalition has abandoned Abadi for the Fatah coalition, which is closely allied to Iran. The Saeroon coalition scored the largest number of votes in the election this year, followed by Fatah and Abadi's Nasr coalition.

For the first time since 2006, the Islamic Dawa party may be out of power in Iraq. From 2006 until 2014 the notorious Nour Al-Maliki ruled Iraq, and it was his policies which led to the rise of ISIS. From 2014 until now, Haider Al-Abadi has been Prime Minister of Iraq. Initially, Saeroon was allied with Abadi, while Fatah was allied with Nouri Al-Maliki. To establish a coalition, the compromise between Saeroon and Fatah may have been the exclusion of both Abadi and Maliki from the next government.

However, the Fatah coalition is even more pro-Iran than Nouri al-Maliki was. Hadi Al-Ameri, leader of the Fatah coalition and the Badr Brigade, fought on Iran's side during the Iran-Iraq war. Should Saeroon side with Fatah, it will inevitably be stained by Iranian intervention in Iraq, meaning that, come next election, Saeroon will be forced to divorce from Fatah or face the wrath of further Iraqi protests.

Why Hadi Al-Amiri as Prime Minister is perfect for the US

Following the Iraqi elections, Hadi Al-Amiri is the most pro-Iranian contestant for the position of Prime Minister. With Iran already overstretched and threatened in Iraq, Hadi Al-Amiri would provide the perfect face of Iran in Iraq - a rallying cry for the people of Iraq against foreign occupation.

The United States' standing in Iraq has improved - mainly due to their withdrawal in 2011 and subsequent invitation to intervene against ISIS in 2014. But should the United States interfere too much in Iraq, it risks alienating Iraqis as it during the occupation before 2011.

This alienation is all the more worrisome after the Iraqi elections in May this year. Haider Al-Abadi is vying to return as Prime Minister with US support, but he is faced with challenges from the Sairoon and Fateh Alliances, both which finished ahead of the Prime Minister's own Nasr Coalition.

The Fateh Alliance is headed by Hadi Al-Amiri, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces and the most pro-Iranian contestant for the position of Iraqi Prime Minister. The Sairoon Alliance, headed by anti-Iranian Cleric Muqtada As-Sadr, has threatened to pull out of any coalition that does not meet its demands, demands which rule out both Abadi and Amiri for Prime Minister.

The Sairoon Alliance is not only planning on pulling out of any coalition that does not meet its demands - it would also become the head of the opposition, an unheard of development in Iraqi politics. Usually every party in the political system holds down some positions in government - for there to be an opposition in parliament would provide a challenge to the ruling elites of Iraq unlike any before.

In light of this, it would be wiser for the United States to concede the position of Prime Minister to Hadi Al-Amiri. With an opposition in parliament and enormous protests on the streets, Iraq's political landscape is changing - for Abadi to remain the figurehead of everything wrong with Iraq would leave the United States without a credible partner in the future.

However, should Hadi Al-Amiri become the next Iraqi Prime Minister, the revolutionary fervor of Iraqis would spill out not only against the corrupt, ruling elite - which has ties to both America and Iran - but also against Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi itself, the culmination of Iran in Iraq. Though the revolution would be bloody, it would signal the end of Iranian dominance in Iraq and force Iraq to lean more pro-American and more pro-Arab.

Iran has tried to both dominate and humiliate Iraq through rampant instability, corruption and terrorism. With Iran more economically isolated than ever before, now is the time for the United States to allow Iran to commit to strategic overreach in Iraq, an overreach which would end in more failure than any other Iranian venture in the region.

Iran triggers its own protests in southern Iraq

The government of Iraq owes Iran over 1 billion dollars' debt in electricity bills. Following the implementation of the Trump Administration's sanctions, Iran cut its electricity supply into Iraq. What followed were explosive protests in Iraq.

The reason these protests were so explosive is because they come from Iraq's majority - the Shi'ite Arab community. And they started in Basra - a city very close to the Iranian border.

One reason suggested for the Iranian cut in electricity is that with such sanctions implemented against it, Iran feels it has no choice but to ask the Iraqi government to pay up, to keep Iran from recession. But there is another, additional reason suggested by pundits: Iran is hoping to destabilize Iraq so that Iraq cannot make up the shortfall of oil production, a shortfall created by US sanctions on Iran.

Such a move is a high risk gamble by the Iranian government which could see it lose considerable influence over Iraq. In fact, that already appears to be happening.

Though the Iraqi government and the paramilitary militias Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi are both very pro-Iranian, the average Iraqi - even the Shi'a - are not. Time and again most Iraqis feel that the Iranians are deliberately destabilizing their country as payback for the brutal Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's - which was started by Iraq. This is because though sharing a religious affiliation, ethnically Iraq and Iran are very different: Iraq is ruled by Arabs, Iran is ruled by Persians. With the United States no longer occupying their country, instead Iraqis are seeing Persian Iran as the unwelcome occupier.

There are Shi'ite Iraqi protesters who are calling for Iran to leave their country. Such rhetoric is excellent news for the current US Administration, Israel, Saudi Arabia and their regional partners. While in Syria it looks as if there will only be an Iranian withdrawal from the southwest of the country, in Iraq a complete Iranian withdrawal looks possible.

Should such protests continue, what follows in Iraq will be, likely, another war: this time between ordinary Iraqis and the pro-Iranian regimes that are established over them. Unlike the last war with ISIS, this war will be an intra-Shi'ite conflict between the Iraqis that are pro-Iran and those that are not.

Shi'ite cleric Muqtada As-Sadr - whose party won the last Iraqi elections - has said that he will not allow Iraq to be dragged into a conflict between US and Iranian interests. However, Iraqi protesters are seeing Muqtada As-Sadr with increasing irrelevance following his controversial alliance with Hadi Al-Ameri, head of the Hash'd As-Sha'bi militias and running second place in the elections. With widespread election fraud, it is increasingly apparent that Iraqis view the elections as illegitimate and Iran as ultimate benefactor in any corruption or fraud in the votes.

This puts additional strain on the United States, which has been tacitly using Iran to help curb the ISIS threat in Iraq. However this strain is likely to be temporary, as President Trump looks to Saudi Arabia to financially challenge Iranian influence in Iraq. Saudi Arabia should be able to buy stability in Iraq - after Iran is ousted.

However, the risks to Iraq after an Iranian pullout are enormous. Not only would it require the disbanding of the Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias; it would also likely collapse the current political structure in Iraq. Such collapse could lead to a coup - like the coup that got US enemy Saddam Hussein into power in the first place.

However, the difference between then and now is that since 2003 Iraq has become a much weaker country. A Saddam-like figure in Iraq would be forced to compromise with the United States, or risk Iran infiltrating into Iraq all over again.

Sadr allies with Amiri, risking revolution on the streets

The Iraqi people are weary of their incompetent and corrupt government - and they blame Iran and the United States.

Though the international community experienced an upsurge of optimism in the election of Muqtada As-Sadr - who ran an anti-Iran campaign - it is clear now to observers Iran still controls the country and still calls the shots.

Whether there were death threats to Sadr from Qasem Suleimani (head of Iran's elite Al-Quds force) or whether Sadr had been an Iran-backed candidate the entire time, the Iraqi people will not stand for another Iran-backed government that takes its resources, shores up its proxies in Syria and Lebanon and cares not a moment about the sufferings of ordinary Iraqis.

With other Arab countries returning to dictatorship and a more stable status quo, the risk for Iran will be overreach: prioritizing its interests while Iraqis long for a return to the way things were - even preferring Saddam Hussein to the current political scene.

President Trump's disinterest in the region only increases the likelihood that Iraq will experience revolution. This is not necessarily something which Trump would be against, provided that the leader which rises out of Iraq is anti-Iranian and against terrorism.

Saudi Arabia's soft power will be indispensable for the future of Iraq. Trump and Israel are likely urging that Saudi Arabia continue using its economic power for Iraq - once American sanctions take full effect on Iran, Saudi Arabia would become a more dominant player for the hearts and minds of domestic Iraq.

Though Saudi Arabia should be able to win over Iran in the economy war, the conservative kingdom may be unable to keep the post-revolutionary government of Iraq pro-American. As with Iran, there is much historical grievance for the United States from ordinary Iraqis.

The wild card here is Turkey. Will Turkey try and orchestrate a revolution in Iraq which oppresses the Kurds and the Shi'a? Possibly - but it would be highly unlikely to be an Islamic revolution - at least initially. The people of Iraq are currently more anti-theocratic than they have ever been. Yet given past strong relations between Saddam Hussein and Turkey, it is not hard to imagine that Turkey will lend significant financial influence to keep - and increase - the pro-Turkish nature of Iraq. In fact, Turkey is more likely to succeed in garnering a top ally out of Iraq post-revolution than even Saudi Arabia.

In the light of such events, it is more important now than ever that the United States keep its position in Afghanistan secure. The Iraq War - as with the Arab Spring - was an unnecessary diversion of resources from counter-terrorism in Afghanistan. The results have been an enormous increase in terrorism followed by a return to the status quo. Should Iraq follow the patterns in Egypt and Syria, it is essential that Afghanistan not return to their status quo - terrorism and the groundwork for 9-11.

2003, the Iraq War and a Kurdish government

The Iraq War was an illegal intervention by the United States.

That there were no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons found in Iraq suggests that "weapons of mass destruction" may have been an excuse for regime change in the face of an unstable-looking Saudi Arabia. Had Saudi Arabia imploded without the Iraq War, the United States would have lost its monopoly on oil in the Arabian Gulf.

There are pundits who suggest that while the Iraq War was partly about oil, it was partly also about protecting the interests of Israel. But after Saddam's government was toppled, a pro-Iranian government took its place, leaving Benjamin Netanyahu more paranoid about Iran and Shi'ism than ever.

Neither Iraq nor America were ready for Iraqi democracy in 2003. It was only after the painful lessons learnt in 2014 - when ISIS invaded Iraq - that Iraq now has a chance for real democracy. In the aftermath of the ISIS invasion, however, the Shi'ite Arabs have an even stronger hold over Iraq: they militarily control Sunni Arab areas - without as of yet rebuilding their infrastructure - and the Shi'ites occupy the Kirkuk oil fields. The US wresting control of Iraq from Iran will be a project that will last decades.

The option of dysfunctional democracy, however, was not the only option for the United States in 2003. In 1991, after the Gulf War, during a debate about invading Iraq, Dick Cheney noted the following:

“[O]nce we'd … gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his government, then we'd have had to put another government in its place. What kind of government? Should it be a Sunni government or [Shiite] government or a Kurdish government or Ba'athist regime? Or maybe we want to bring in some of the Islamic fundamentalists?”

(At the time in 1991, Dick Cheney adamantly opposed any invasion of Iraq, and his reasoning was sound.)

In any case, installing democracy in Iraq fueled the instability in Syria, sparked the flames that ISIS later fanned and, to top it all off, gave Iran an important ally in its Shi'ite crescent. Could have the US installed an Iraqi government to benefit its interest more so than the government installed in 2003?

Yes. The US could have installed a Kurdish government.

Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Sunni Arabs, a minority in Iraq, have controlled the unstable region with an iron fist. This idea of the ruling minority is not unique to Iraq: the Al-Assad family, though from the Alawite minority in Syria, rule over its Sunni Arab majority.

The Kurds have no homeland. The Sykes-Picot treaty ensures that the Kurds will remain a minority group stretched across Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran without a homeland for the foreseeable future. The only way to guarantee the creation of a state across traditional Kurdish lands would be to destroy the Turkish state and annex northern Iraq, Syria and western Iran. It is not going to happen.

But in 2003, the US forces could have catapulted Iraq's Kurdish minority into power at the expense of its Shi'ite majority and Sunni Arab minority. If such a government had been installed by the US, the Kurds would have reversed the policy of Arabization of traditional Kurdish lands, such as Hawija and Kirkuk. It would have been able to repopulate such areas by bringing in Kurds from Iran, Syria and Turkey - which would also have eased the Kurdish problem in those countries.

While short-term causing Iran and Syria headaches and greatly upsetting Turkey, in the long-term the Kurds would have been forced to move out of Syria, Iran and Turkey and into Iraq. Such immigration would have solidified Kurdish hold of Iraq, much like Shi'ite immigration today from Afghanistan and Pakistan has solidified Shi'ite control of Iraq.

Even had the US withdrawn from Iraq, ISIS would have never been able to take control of Mosul and never been able to genocide Iraq's Christian or Yazidi minorities. This is because Nineveh province and Mosul city would have been too close to Kurdish territory to be tolerated. But bloodletting between Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs would have been much worse, and the majority of the ISIS war would have been fought in the south of Iraq rather than the north. Many thousands more Shi'ite Arabs would have died in such a war which, while terrible, would have meant Iranian proxies in Iraq would have been weakened after the war on ISIS instead of strengthened.

A Kurdish-controlled Iraq would have not been entirely unpopular in the Arab world either. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations were terrified of Saddam's Iraq, and a Kurdish Iraq would have remained a block against Iran and posed no threat to Kuwait or any Gulf territory - only a threat to Iran, Turkey and Syria, none of whom are great allies of the Arabian Gulf.

Iraqi-Israeli relations would have been quiet for a considerable time period, as Saddam's Iraq was a champion of the Palestinian cause and, though Kurds champion the Israeli cause, too overt relations between Israel and Iraq would have created a terrorist epidemic among Iraqi Arabs unlike any seen thus far.

Baghdad would have become a city and province populated by Arabs and Kurds alike. Though initially seeing a surge of sectarian bloodshed, security from Kurdish forces would have been tight and would have forced Iranian and ISIS proxies out of Baghdad and into other areas.

The reason this option needs to be discussed is because any military action accomplished by a nation must be thought through with a careful and deliberate outcome for the day after. Perhaps it was essential to US interests for Iraq to be governed by a US-friendly government. But it was not essential to install a Shi'ite-dominated democracy into one of the most unstable countries on Earth, and one which was unable to protect its Christian and Yazidis from slaughter and genocide.

Though a minority, the Kurds would have had a better track record at protecting its Christian and Yazidi minorities and providing security for Iraq. They would have acted as a bulwark against Iran and been turned into a Kurdish country by Kurdish immigration from Syria, Turkey and Iran. Escalated violence between Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs would have been unavoidable, as it is in Iraq today, but as the violence receded, it would have been a far friendlier government in charge than the Iraqi government of today, and one more likely to protect US interests for the future.

The next time the US wages war on a Middle-East government, it must think very carefully about its policy for the day after. Or else terrorism will only grow and never recede as the US continues intervening in the Middle-East.

Israel's Iraqi solution to its Syrian problem

It is no secret that Israel is very unhappy with the peace process in Syria, backed largely by Iran and Russia.

Israel had hoped for regime change in Syria, due in no small part to the immense benefits it has received from regime change in Libya. Previous analysis can be found here:

http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com.au/2017/08/haftar-al-khalifa-and-israel.html

Syria has remained one of Palestine's staunchest allies and continues to give an Arab face to the Palestinian cause. Syria remains Iran's most important Arab ally and gives Hezbollah important support.

But in facing the reality of both Syria and Iraq, Israel is largely crippled by paranoia of Iran. This is understandable, given Iran's slogan and anthem being "death to America, death to Israel." Yet in the new Middle-East, it is imperative for Benyamin Netanyahu to look beyond the threat of Iran, and look to Iran's weakest ally: Iraq.

Unlike Syria after Russian intervention, Iraq is still beset with instability, corruption, chaos and terrorism. Despite the US-led military campaign against ISIS, sectarian strife continues, and sees little chance of abating.

Since 2003, neither America nor Iran have been able to stabilize Iraq. While improved Iraqi ties with Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia look promising in the short-term, the Gulf region is set for regional explosion and cannot be relied on long-term.

In the wake of defeat in Syria, Israel must seize this opportunity for improved, covert ties with Iraq. There are other Middle-East allies in the region who have covertly improved ties with Israel while keeping public ties hostile. Such a model should be adopted for improving Iraqi-Israeli ties.

Israel must not forget that most Iraqis who fought the Iranians were Shi'ites, and many Shi'ites see Iran's role in Iraq as detrimental to their security and stability. Israel should take advantage of this resentment to gain itself another Arab ally, one whose stability can help reduce the threat of terrorism regionally and globally.

Iraqi Prime Minister continues to show political mastery

Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, has recently launched an anti-ISIS campaign into Hawija province. This shows that for the Iraqi Kurds, Abadi is a fearful adversary.

On the 25th of September, the Iraqi Kurds are voting in an independence referendum. It is no coincidence that Abadi has unleashed his forces against Hawija at this moment: Hawija is the Arab half of the Kirkuk province, and Kirkuk is disputed territory between Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds.

Haider Al-Abadi has shown an innate understanding of Iraqi and Arab politics. By striking at Hawija province now, he is sending a very clear message to the Kurds: if we can beat ISIS, we can beat you.

Whether the Kurdish question in Iraq remains merely a political dispute or escalates to a military one is uncertain. Abadi himself has threatened to use force if the referendum results in violence, which could be interpreted as either reactionary or as an excuse for military intervention. Either way, tensions between Baghdad and Erbil are reaching breaking point, and only a leader like Haider Al-Abadi has any hope of leading Iraq into a brighter future.

Mosul, Tal Afar, then Hawija

Iraqi Army forces successfully liberated Mosul over a month ago, freeing one of the largest Iraqi cities from ISIS' grip. Since then they have moved north-west to the city of Tal Afar, and have mostly liberated it with help from Hashd Ash-Sha'abi.

Next in sight is Hawija, the southern half of Kirkuk province. After dealing diplomatically with the difficult Turkmen area of Tal Afar, dealing with Hawija, an area heavily mixed between Arabs and Kurds, should prove less of a challenge.

After Hawija, the last territorial presence for ISIS will be in western Anbar province. Unfortunately for the Iraqi Army, the Syrian Arab Army is annihilating ISIS in eastern Syria, so it is likely ISIS' Syrian remnants will regroup in western Anbar province.

The last ISIS battle in Anbar province is likely to be bloody and long. And even after all Iraqi territories are liberated, the threat of ISIS to Iraq should not be underestimated.

Iran and Kurds greatest threat to Iraqi peace

Unlike Syria, Iraq's path to stability is not so straightforward.

Though ISIS has been driven out of its urban centres in Iraq, they still hold onto areas in Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar Province. Even should the Iraqi Army and affiliates crush ISIS from the region, there is every potential that ISIS may return. The trigger for an ISIS return is further conflict fueled by Iran and the Kurdish question.

September this year will see the Kurds vote for independence in a referendum. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, though pro-American, is anti-referendum and as such Kurdish independence would weaken his hand considerably. This could lead to a civil war between the Iraqi Kurds and the rest of Iraq, putting America in a difficult position, as both Iraq and the Kurds are US allies.

Unlike in Syria, Iran is a destabilizing factor in Iraq. With the Iraqi provincial and federal elections to take place in 2018, a new divide is emerging: on one side of the divide is the likes of Nouri Al-Maliki and Iranian-backed political parties and militias. On the other is Muqtada As-Sadr, Iyad Allawi and Haider Al-Abadi, who espouse Iraqi Nationalism and are more critical of Iran's role in the region. Yet both sides of this divide are Shi'ite.

With the establishment of Hash'd Ash-Sha'abi, or the Popular Mobilization forces, an intra Shi'ite war in Iraq is all the more likely, as many of the groups are fierce rivals and differ in how loyal they are to Iran or the Iraqi government. To strengthen his own hand, Abadi might unleash the Iranian-backed elements of Hashd Ash-Sha'abi on the Kurds, so that if the Kurds were victorious, Iran could be blamed and Abadi would remain Prime Minister.

In any case, Abadi and the Iraqi nationalists have support from certain groups that the Iranian-backed forces do not: the Iraqi Sunni Arabs and the US. Even should the Kurds break away from Iraq, the Iraqi nationalists are likely to prevail over the Iranian proxies, because the Sunni Arabs provide the additional weight needed and Trump is eyeing Iraq as the front line in the US' war on Iran.

But over the next 12 months, Haider Al-Abadi will have to tread carefully. His reputation has been made through defeating ISIS - how he handles the Kurds or Iran will determine his prominence in Iraq's future.

Can Abadi save Iraq?

Haider Al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq since 2014, had an enormous responsibility on his shoulders: destroy ISIS from Iraq. That task has been mostly completed, except in more sparse regions like Tal Afar, Hawija and Al-Qaim.

Yet still there is a risk of ISIS returning to Iraq. One only has to look back at 2006 to know that ISIS once existed in the Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar provinces under the name Islamic State of Iraq, previously known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Sound familiar?

ISIS has existed in Iraq, with different names, since the beginning of the Iraq War. It is a symptom of a persistent problem: Sunni Arabs felt under represented, and Shi'ite Arabs did not care for their Sunni Arab brothers. This fueled a toxic combination: one of Sunni Arab frustration but also of Shi'ite Arab indifference. This is why the Iraqi Army, largely Shi'ite, fled when ISIS invaded Sunni Arab Iraq in 2014.

But Haider Al-Abadi is not Nouri Al-Maliki. Nouri Al-Maliki was the previous Prime Minister of Iraq who fuelled sectarianism in the country deliberately, which can be seen from his rhetoric and policies. Abadi, however, is different: he is seeking to bring the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis together as one country and people.

Can Abadi stem the tide of an ISIS return? That will largely depend on how he handles the Sunni-Shi'ite Arab relations post-ISIS. His recent visit to Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab powerhouse, the first country on his Middle-East tour, is a good start. But his greatest challenge in the short-term will be negotiating a settlement with the Kurds in Kirkuk and Erbil - should the Kurds break away from Iraq, Abadi will be faced with an even bigger challenge: how to maintain credibility after losing Iraqi Kurdistan.

Another concern is the increased instability in the Gulf. ISIS may indeed rear its ugly head in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE, and, as it did from Syria, may seek to invade Iraq from the south. But Iraq will only be susceptible to another ISIS invasion if Abadi cannot unite Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis together under him.

Abadi's task is an enormous one. Should he succeed, Iraq's unimaginable suffering would lessen at last.

Saudi Arabia moving to support Iraq Kurds?

For further information:

http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/b341be09-9be6-4707-bdfb-dc4d7fd68ed4
http://abcnews.go.com/International/trumps-middle-east-trip-alienated-key-counterterror-ally/story?id=47584219

Iraqi President Fuad Massum, a Kurd, was invited to Saudi Arabia's conference against terrorism and Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, a Shi'ite Arab, was not. Now, since Qatar has been blockaded and Turkey has sided with the small Gulf state, Saudis have been taking to Twitter to side with the Iraqi Kurds in the upcoming referendum for independence.

Saudi moves against Qatar have caused Turkey to move to protect Qatar, which has caused the Saudis to support the Iraqi Kurds, because Turkey has a Kurdish problem.

Middle-East politics hardly gets more complex than that.

With ISIS being decimated in Syria and going back into hiding in Iraq; with the Syrian rebels largely holed up in Idlib and Dera'a; with the Yemeni quagmire having no end in sight; with the Qatar blockade unsuccessful due to Iranian and Turkish backing of Qatar, Saudi Arabia's ultimate revenge on all who have stopped its policies for the region would be in the funding and supporting of an independent Kurdistan, first in Iraq then in Syria against Bashar Al-Assad.

An independent Kurdistan across Syria and Iraq would weaken both nations - who largely owe allegiance to Iran - and would force Turkey and Iran to focus more on internal politics (against their Kurdish populations) over external. This, in Saudi's mind, would help them in their battles against Qatar and Yemen.

Unlike ISIS and the Syrian rebels, the Kurds are unlikely to be seen by the US as enemies. However, the Trump Administration has not completely endorsed Kurdish independence in Iraq at least. As for Syria, that is more difficult to tell.

In the Iraqi Kurdish Independence referendum, Trump has sided with the Iraqi government, saying the US would only support Kurdish independence if the Baghdad government agreed to it. But Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be so deterred as the US is, which bodes for an uncertain time ahead for the Middle-East. Will the Kurds break away from Syria and Iraq? Will Iran, Turkey and Qatar fund instability in the Gulf in response? These are all dangerous questions which will be answered in the coming months.

Egypt trading oil relations with Saudi for Iraq

Egypt is wrenching itself from Saudi Arabia's orbit.

Saudi Arabia still believes that Bashar Al-Assad, the dictator of Syria, must be removed for a settlement in Syria. However, most regional players now support Assad and do not want to see him removed - Egypt and Turkey are two prominent examples.

This policy has caused a sticking issue between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt's priority is stability and preventing terrorism from increasing, whereas Saudi's priority is curbing Iranian influence. In Syria, Iranian influence and stability collide.

As a result, Saudi suspended oil imports into Egypt for six months. And this has caused Egypt to look to Iraq for oil imports.

This is great news for Iraq and terrible news for Saudi. I have long since maintained that the world is going to look increasingly to Iraq for oil over and above Saudi Arabia, and that we are likely to see a reversal in stability and instability between the two countries depending on level of healthy oil exports.

As for Iraq, she really needs Egypt's alliance. Iraq desperately needs to have its military trained up, and the Egyptian army is a great example of what a powerful Arab military can look like. Egypt can buy Iraqi oil and in exchange assist Iraq with increasing counter terrorism capabilities.

I see that in the future, Egypt will have great relations with Arab nationalist countries like Syria and Iraq, as well as with smaller Arab countries like Jordan and Libya, and a smaller level of rapprochement with Iran, while Egyptian-Saudi relations will completely deteriorate.

This represents a realignment for Arab nationalist countries closer to Iraq than Saudi Arabia. While this is great news for stability in Iraq, this increases the likelihood of Saudi Arabia being vulnerable to economic crises and civil war, which also means more ISIS and more terrorism for the Arabian Gulf.

The Confederacy of Iraq

In my previous article on this blog, "The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum," I got some important facts incorrect regarding what is likely to transpire:

http://iraqwarjwaver.blogspot.com.au/2017/03/the-iraqi-kurdistan-independence.html

This article will reflect the latest data and correct previous errors made in the last post.

Trump has said that he would only agree to Kurdish secession if the Baghdad Government also agreed to it. The Abadi government, willing to compromise over Kirkuk (leaving it to a democratic election as for whether Kirkuk stays under the semi-autonomous Kurdish region or not) is unlikely to allow complete separation from Iraq.

However, Abadi is likely to allow the Kurds complete autonomy under the Baghdad government, akin to a confederacy. This would mean that Baghdad and Irbil would be 2 parts of the one confederacy - two independent states under the one state. This is the likely scenario which would also keep Iraq together.

The Iraqi Kurds, under this agreement, would be allowed to keep all of their resources for themselves. They would be allowed to hoist their flags up with the Iraqi flag. However, an attack on Baghdad-controlled Iraq would mean an attack on Irbil-controlled Iraq - i.e. Kurds would be forced to come to Abadi's aid, and vice-versa.

Would this lead to a Sunni-Shi'ite Arab breakup of Iraq? Unlikely. Neither the Shi'ites nor the Sunnis want to break the remains of Iraq up, not even into a confederacy.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum

The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum is dangerous for Iraq.

Iraqi Kurds are considering becoming independent of the rest of Iraq. Mistrusted by both Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis, the Kurds overwhelmingly see secession as a better option than remaining within Iraq.

If they held the referendum and voted to secede from the rest of Iraq, what would be the outcome? Some thoughts.

1) War between Iraq and the Kurds. The rest of Iraq, including Hashd Ash-Sha'abi, the Iraqi army and several Sunni Iraqi tribes, would wage war on the Kurds for trying to fracture their country. The war would be bloody, but it would likely result in Iraqi Kurdish victory. This would be especially true given that should the Iraqi Kurds vote to secede from Iraq, America would remain neutral in the war.

2) War between Syrian Kurds and Turkey. Turkey has been outraged by Obama's policy of funding the Syrian Kurds to defeat ISIS in northern Syria. Now the Kurds control enormous swathes of territory in Syria, including Kobane, the Arab region of Hasakeh and are not far from the city of Raqqa. This is the reason Turkey has now entered the Syrian Civil War on the side of Russia, Iran and Syria: they want the Syrian Kurdish threat to come to an end.

Trump is unlikely to continue this policy of using the Syrian Kurds to oust ISIS. Instead, Trump is likely to side with Turkey in ousting ISIS from Arab regions in Syria, then turn a blind eye to war between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey. The Turks would likely defeat the Kurds and potentially annex the Syrian Kurdish territory while allowing Bashar Al-Assad to remain President of the rest of Syria. This war would only increase in likelihood should the Kurds in Iraq secede.

3) Ayad Allawi coming to power. With the Kurds winning a war against the remnants of Iraq, the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis would be humiliated. They would likely overturn the status quo in the next elections, meaning that Haider Al-Abadi would no longer be President, the da'wa party would lose its popularity, and Iraq would be handed over to a mix of secular and militia Iraqis.

In the central and religiously mixed regions of Iraq, Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi'ite, would likely end up with overwhelming popularity. In the southern regions of Iraq, the Hashd Ash-Sha'bi 'heroes' would probably end up in charge, meaning two very different groups would be vying for political influence in Iraq.

However, Trump would likely support Ayad Allawi over the Shi'ite militias, putting Iraq back under dictatorship but under stability. Then Kurds would win in northern Iraq, dealing one blow to Iran, and secular Shi'ism would win in the rest of Iraq, dealing another blow to Iran.

what does post-ISIS Iraq look like?

What does post-ISIS Iraq look like?

Make or break.

After the Mosul campaign, ISIS' hold on Iraq would severely lessen, but by no means would it end. On the one hand, ISIS still controls territory in Hawija - which is southern Kirkuk province, a traditionally Kurdish region which Saddam Hussein repopulated with Sunni Arabs - and western Anbar province, which borders Syria and Jordan.

Yet ISIS' hold on Iraq would still exist after being driven out of Hawija and western Anbar. How? Suicide bombings.

Between 2003 and 2010, there were over 1000 suicide bombings that occurred in Iraq. Since then many more have occurred, especially since ISIS invaded Iraq from Syria in 2014. Suicide bombings destabilize Sunni-Shi'ite relations enormously, as they usually are perpetrated by Sunnis on Shi'ites. They cause backlash by Shi'ites on Sunnis, which in turn leads to more suicide bombings.

ISIS are the masters of suicide bombings. The Iraqi government will need to work very hard on security measures to prevent suicide bombings from occurring in the country, especially in Baghdad, where the majority occur.

The trick will be for Sunni-Shi'ite Arab Iraqi relations to improve substantially. In this regard, Haider Al-Abadi, the current Prime Minister of Iraq, excels over his predecessor, Nouri Al-Maliki, who largely inflamed the tensions. This is more important than giving Sunni Arabs autonomy: instead of autonomy, unity and nationalism must be encouraged.

The other trick will be for Yazidis and Christians to have a prominent place in Iraq, particularly in Nineveh. While much is said about the Sunni Arabs, Shi'ite Arabs and Kurds needing to get along in Iraq, little is said about the oppression and persecution towards Iraqi minorities. This is not a phenomenon that came with ISIS; Christians and Yazidis have been seen as agents of America and the devil since the beginning of the Iraq War.

How extreme a Muslim community is depends on how they treat their minorities. If Abadi can make important steps towards enabling Christians and Yazidis to have a prominent political voice in northern Iraq, it will do much good for the region as a whole.

But perhaps the biggest threat for a post-ISIS Iraq is Iran. Iran has a heavy sway over the country, and unlike in Syria, Iran's role in Iraq is destabilizing and unhelpful. Should Abadi bring Sunni Arabs, Shi'ites, Christians and Yazidis together, then pro-Iranian Shi'ite militias will destabilize Iraq from the south in response.

Should the Iranian militias gain more sway over Iraq, ISIS will return and return stronger. Thankfully, unlike Obama, Donald Trump would not put up with Iranian militias destabilizing Iraq and likely respond accordingly.

But it must be an Iraqi response to Iranian militias to have a more lasting impact. Should Iraqis of all kinds turn on the Iranian backed Shi'ite militias - as is happening against previous Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki - then Iraq is more likely to come together, not break apart as would occur should America fight the Iranian-backed militias alone.

I for one am optimistic. Donald Trump is the right leader at the right time for Iraq. On the campaign trail, he has criticized the Iraq War many times, been honest about Iran's hold on Iraq, pledged to eradicate ISIS quickly from Iraq, vowed to up oil exports from Iraq, vowed to not forget the Middle-East Christians and has promised Haider Al-Abadi strong and firm support.

I expect Iraq to stabilize drastically by the end of Trump's time in office.

Trump likely to end Democracy in Iraq

Iraqi Democracy has been abysmal.

The level of corruption under the previous Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki was enormous. Haider Al-Abadi, while promising reform, is still a member of pro-Iranian Islamic Da'wa party which means that Iran's preference has always dominated Iraq's "democratic" preference.

To reinforce this Iranian preference is in all of the Shi'ite militias running rampant in Iraq's south. These militias make Iraq's south unsafe, and also undermine the democratic process by intimidation and threats to their own community.

In short, Iraqi democracy only benefits Iran.

Trump has been critical of the Iraq War for a wide variety of reasons. Chief among these is that Iran benefits from Iraq's current climate more than America. Trump has been critical of the rise of Sunni discontent through ISIS and equally critical of the lack of economic benefits for the United States from the venture, i.e. the oil. He has also been more recently critical of the lack of support by America for the Christian populations of the Middle-East.

With all this in mind, it seems that Trump is set to re-shake the balance in Iraq to stabilize it - i.e. Trump plans to end Democracy in Iraq.

To reinstall a dictator in Iraq is a complicated process. Firstly, Trump will do nothing until ISIS is defeated in Iraq. Secondly, it would be unlikely that Trump would install a Sunni dictator in Iraq, as many of the Iraqi Sunni Arab tribes would unleash their rage at the Shi'ite community to an unnecessary level.

Thirdly, it would be unlikely that Haider Al-Abadi or anyone from the Islamic Da'wa Party would control Iraq under a dictatorship. To do so would be to keep Iraq in the grip of Iran.

Fourthly, it would be unlikely that a Christian or a Yazidi would be the dictator in control of Iraq. Such policy would create too many internal enemies without strong enough allies.

The only two options I see would be either a Kurdish-dominated dictatorship or a secular Shi'ite like Ayad Allawi taking control. Each have advantages and disadvantages, and it is difficult to say which Trump would take.

But in either scenario, the threat of ISIS return would be greatly reduced. On the one hand, Ayad Allawi is immensely popular with Sunni Iraqi Arabs, and is a bridge between previous supporters of Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Shi'ites. He could heal the sectarian wounds of Iraq. On the other hand, Sunni Arabs would prefer being ruled by secular Sunni Iraqi Kurds than Shi'ite Iraqi Islamists.

However, though the threat of ISIS would be reduced, a new threat would emerge: a Shi'ite terrorist organisation in southern Iraq. Though Kurdish and Sunni Arab Iraq would likely stabilize under the new dictatorship, Shi'ite Iraq would become more unstable and less safe. However this benefits the Trump Administration more than hinders it, as they are able to claim lasting victory over ISIS and are merely fighting Iran, whose destabilization of Iraq caused ISIS in the first place.

With Trump reshaping Iraq for stability and not for democracy, Iran would be weakened in the region, and America would be fighting a proxy war with Iran in Iraq.

In stark contrast, Hillary Clinton believed in weakening Iran by overthrowing Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, which would have had disastrous consequences for the region. Had Hillary Clinton succeeded in overthrowing the Syrian government, it would have resulted in instability so far unparalleled in the Middle-East: genocides of Christians, Alawites and Druze would have occurred, and Syrian Sunnis would have fought with Israel on the Syrian-Israeli border under ISIS and Al-Qaeda. That is to say nothing of the spillover of instability into Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Rather than weakening Iran by destabilizing more countries, Trump has chosen the more logical conclusion: stop destabilizing Syria and stabilize Iraq by ridding it of Iranian influence. To do this would be difficult, but is likely to have a lasting impact on stability for the entire Middle-East.

Will Trump hand Iraq over to the Kurds? Detailed analysis

The last 14 years have seen Iraq in absolute chaos.

On the one hand, the Iraqi government has been subdued by Iranian influence, meaning that democracy in Iraq benefits Iran, not Iraq. Iranian puppet Muqtada As-Sadr has sizable influence, as does his militias. Hashd Ash-sha'abi and other militias are growing in power and strength, and the Iraqi government has not the strength to reign them in. Even Nouri Al-Maliki, the previous Prime Minister who was responsible for the Sunni Arab discontent, still holds enormous influence.

That is in the south. In the center of Iraq, Sunni Arabs were so much neglected that when the most violent extremist group of our time - the self-declared Islamic State - invaded Sunni Arab regions of Iraq, the Sunni Arabs were left to their fate by the Iraqi Army. Today, most Sunni Arabs are in Iraqi Kurdistan for refuge.

Yet in the north, in Iraqi Kurdistan, there is stability. Yes, that's right: in Iraq, there is a region with stability. It's Iraqi Kurdistan.

America has had a positive relationship with the Iraqi Kurds, first shown when America implemented a 'no-fly-zone' in Northern Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein massacring them. And no, that's not rhetoric - it is well documented that Saddam Hussein was massacring Iraqi Kurds during the Iran-Iraq war.

In turn, the Kurds have shown again and again a willingness to work with America in the face of common adversaries. Once America deposed of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds ended up with an enormous amount of autonomy. Since the Islamic State invaded Iraq, the Kurds have increased their territory and their autonomy.

Trump has shown a willingness to reexamine Iraq War policy, rather than just making more Iraq Wars elsewhere - like Obama did with the Arab Spring. Obama desired to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad in Syria - a stable ally of Iran - while doing nothing about Iran's influence in Iraq - an unstable ally of Iran. Talk about hypocrisy!

At least Trump sees that Iran having an ally in Syria is not worth destabilizing the entire Middle-East for. Trump is not going to remove Bashar Al-Assad from power in Syria.

However, the Trump Administration has put Iran 'on notice' for testing a ballistic missile in defiance of the law of the United Nations. This has begun with American sanctions on Iran, and is unlikely to end there. In Trump's words, 'nothing is off the table.'

Trump has also not been shy to expose that Iraq is controlled by Iran. In a tweet, Trump said and I quote,

“Iran is rapidly taking over more and more of Iraq even after the US has squandered three trillion dollars there. Obvious long ago!”

Rather than removing Bashar Al-Assad from power in Syria - which would create enormous problems for Israel and the region - and more likely than an Iran War is Trump re-invading Iraq.

To be sure, this is unlikely to be Trump's first point of call. First he wishes to implement American sanctions on Iran, which he has done. Second, he would get his allies to implement sanctions on Iran. If neither deters Iran from seeking nuclear capability, then stronger measures involving military strength would undoubtedly be enforced by the Trump Administration.

But Trump cannot afford to have Iraq warring on America as America wars on Iran. Most of the political power in Iraq is with pro-Iranian Shi'ite militias, who would obstruct Trump in Iraq just as he seeks to obstruct Iran.

If a decision to military action on Iran were to be made by the Trump Administration, it would likely be initiated by a second invasion of Iraq, to remove the pro-Iranian government and remove an Iranian ally from the region.

While such an undertaking would be enormous and expensive, it would be less enormous and less expensive than invading and occupying Iran. Such unilateral action in Iraq might force Iran to give up on nuclear capabilities for fear of similar reprisals.

But what government could replace the failed Iraqi democracy? Either a Shi'ite secular dictator - perhaps making Allawi a dictator - or, perhaps even more tempting for Trump, the Iraqi Kurds.

For the Kurds, their goal has never been domination - only independence from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria to form their own state. But Trump could tempt them with much more than just independence. Controlling Iraq would give the Kurds priority access to Iraqi oil wealth; priority access to Basra, the only port in the country; and, temptingly, Kurdish dominance in the region for the first time since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

The advantages of a Kurdish-controlled Iraq for Trump's Middle-East are obvious. Kurds would look after the Iraqi Christians; Kurds would make sure Iraqi Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs stop fighting each other; Kurds would quench Iranian and Saudi proxy wars in Iraq by maintaining the peace; Kurds would provide a form of governance and stability not seen since the days of Saddam Hussein, and probably with less sectarianism and bloodshed as was common under Saddam Hussein.

Kurds from Turkey would have a place of refuge in Iraq; Iran would be panicked by their Kurdish problem in the north-west of their country. If Iraq stabilized under the Kurds, Iranian Kurdistan might be annexed by Iraq and Trump to further reprimand Iran if their nuclear actions continue.

Of course such a sysmic shift in the Middle-East would create consequences. Turkey would of course not be happy with the result. Iran and Syria would also be unhappy, but this bothers Trump less, as Trump does not intend to ally strongly with either power. The majority of the Gulf would be very happy; Sunni hardliners would again focus on Israel over Iran, and Israel would be relieved to have an ally in the region.

Many of the Sunni Arab Iraqis are currently seeking refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, so it would not be hard for the Kurds to offer the Sunni Arabs an alliance to get their towns back from the Shi'ite militias. Sunni Iraq, Kurdish and Arab, would fall to Kurdish power rapidly.

But the Shi'ite Iraqis in particular would not go down without a fight. It would be difficult to drive Iranian influence back into Iran from Iraq, but with American help such a fight could be accomplished.

The advantage of Kurdish control of Iraq would be Trump able to easily dispose of "Iraqi democracy," one of the most corrupt democracies in the world. Instead, the Kurds would control Iraq with secularism, slowly introducing Arabs to proper democracy, as did Bashar Al-Assad in Syria before the war.

By no means is re-invastion of Iraq Trump's first point of call. He would of course hope to provide strong, firm support to Iraq under current political circumstances. But should Iran continue to search for nuclear capabilities, war and restriction of allies and resources would be the only solution to such provocation.

Don't worry, Abadi. Trump's Muslim Ban does not change benefits for Iraq

Much has happened in the first 10 days of Trump's Presidency. But the most controversial has been the Muslim Ban from 7 different countries.

It is interesting, though, that Barrack Obama was the one to name the 7 countries, not Trump. Also interesting that in 2011, Obama banned Iraqi refugees for 6 months, twice as long as Trump's immigration ban.

I am disappointed in the way Trump banned the Iraqis together with the other countries, as it sends the wrong message to Iraq.


So, I decided to respond with a letter of sorts to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi.



Dear Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi,


Expect things to get better - a lot better.

Trump's Iraqi policy can be summed up in two phrases: "bomb the hell out of ISIS," and, "get out of the nation-building business and focus on stability." Abadi, I would advise you not to worry about Trump saying he would "take [your] Iraqi oil," because in Trump language, "take their oil," means upping oil relations between Iraq and the West substantially.

Abadi, you and your country are incredibly important allies to America. You are not only important because of your oil - you are important because you have a Christian community, and Trump has vowed to remember Christians of the Middle-East in his foreign policy. You are important to Trump because you are on the front line in the war on terror, and terrorism is your common enemy. You are important to Trump because you have a Shi'ite community, which means you can work as a middle ground between Iran and America.

You are important to Trump because within your country lies the secret to the defeat of terrorism.

Abadi, your oil is not just a resource - it is a weapon, a weapon which can oust countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar from their high thrones, from which they destabilize the world with terrorism. If Trump unlocks the oil potential of your land Iraq, Iraq will stabilize quickly - but also, Qatar and Saudi Arabia will go bankrupt and be no longer able to fund terrorism.

To you, Abadi, I say this: wait. Wait and see for what I tell you will come to pass before your eyes. When the oil rivers flow from Iraq, peace and stability will increase dramatically in the Middle-East, and your country will benefit most of all.


Yours sincerely,
John Waver

Why I am disappointed in Trump's Muslim Ban

Make no mistake: I think a Muslim ban is needed for several countries in the Middle-East to the United States.

However for Trump, choosing Iraq and not Pakistan was a grave mistake and potential injury to real allies on the ground. Having met Muslim extremists myself, I have never found a western-born Iraqi who supports terrorism as I have met western-born Somalis and Pakistanis. It is good that Somalia was selected - it was grievous that Pakistan was not.

Iraq's Sunni Muslim population was largely secular before the Iraq War. This suggests that the majority of Iraqi Sunnis only ally with ISIS because they feel they have no choice - though the minority, such as in the case of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, benefit more from supporting terrorism than emigrating to America and returning to their secular roots.

Iraq has the potential to replace Saudi Arabia as America's top oil and Arab ally. But adding Iraq to the list of banned Muslim-majority countries threatens to undo that and throw Iraq more forcefully into the arms of Iran.

Far better would have been for Trump to choose Pakistan over Iraq. I agree with not adding Afghanistan to the list, as many Afghanis support American intervention against the Taliban. But adding Iraq to the list threatens to undermine peace and stability returning to the Middle-East. Trump needs to tread more carefully.