Iran triggers its own protests in southern Iraq

The government of Iraq owes Iran over 1 billion dollars' debt in electricity bills. Following the implementation of the Trump Administration's sanctions, Iran cut its electricity supply into Iraq. What followed were explosive protests in Iraq.

The reason these protests were so explosive is because they come from Iraq's majority - the Shi'ite Arab community. And they started in Basra - a city very close to the Iranian border.

One reason suggested for the Iranian cut in electricity is that with such sanctions implemented against it, Iran feels it has no choice but to ask the Iraqi government to pay up, to keep Iran from recession. But there is another, additional reason suggested by pundits: Iran is hoping to destabilize Iraq so that Iraq cannot make up the shortfall of oil production, a shortfall created by US sanctions on Iran.

Such a move is a high risk gamble by the Iranian government which could see it lose considerable influence over Iraq. In fact, that already appears to be happening.

Though the Iraqi government and the paramilitary militias Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi are both very pro-Iranian, the average Iraqi - even the Shi'a - are not. Time and again most Iraqis feel that the Iranians are deliberately destabilizing their country as payback for the brutal Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's - which was started by Iraq. This is because though sharing a religious affiliation, ethnically Iraq and Iran are very different: Iraq is ruled by Arabs, Iran is ruled by Persians. With the United States no longer occupying their country, instead Iraqis are seeing Persian Iran as the unwelcome occupier.

There are Shi'ite Iraqi protesters who are calling for Iran to leave their country. Such rhetoric is excellent news for the current US Administration, Israel, Saudi Arabia and their regional partners. While in Syria it looks as if there will only be an Iranian withdrawal from the southwest of the country, in Iraq a complete Iranian withdrawal looks possible.

Should such protests continue, what follows in Iraq will be, likely, another war: this time between ordinary Iraqis and the pro-Iranian regimes that are established over them. Unlike the last war with ISIS, this war will be an intra-Shi'ite conflict between the Iraqis that are pro-Iran and those that are not.

Shi'ite cleric Muqtada As-Sadr - whose party won the last Iraqi elections - has said that he will not allow Iraq to be dragged into a conflict between US and Iranian interests. However, Iraqi protesters are seeing Muqtada As-Sadr with increasing irrelevance following his controversial alliance with Hadi Al-Ameri, head of the Hash'd As-Sha'bi militias and running second place in the elections. With widespread election fraud, it is increasingly apparent that Iraqis view the elections as illegitimate and Iran as ultimate benefactor in any corruption or fraud in the votes.

This puts additional strain on the United States, which has been tacitly using Iran to help curb the ISIS threat in Iraq. However this strain is likely to be temporary, as President Trump looks to Saudi Arabia to financially challenge Iranian influence in Iraq. Saudi Arabia should be able to buy stability in Iraq - after Iran is ousted.

However, the risks to Iraq after an Iranian pullout are enormous. Not only would it require the disbanding of the Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias; it would also likely collapse the current political structure in Iraq. Such collapse could lead to a coup - like the coup that got US enemy Saddam Hussein into power in the first place.

However, the difference between then and now is that since 2003 Iraq has become a much weaker country. A Saddam-like figure in Iraq would be forced to compromise with the United States, or risk Iran infiltrating into Iraq all over again.

Sadr allies with Amiri, risking revolution on the streets

The Iraqi people are weary of their incompetent and corrupt government - and they blame Iran and the United States.

Though the international community experienced an upsurge of optimism in the election of Muqtada As-Sadr - who ran an anti-Iran campaign - it is clear now to observers Iran still controls the country and still calls the shots.

Whether there were death threats to Sadr from Qasem Suleimani (head of Iran's elite Al-Quds force) or whether Sadr had been an Iran-backed candidate the entire time, the Iraqi people will not stand for another Iran-backed government that takes its resources, shores up its proxies in Syria and Lebanon and cares not a moment about the sufferings of ordinary Iraqis.

With other Arab countries returning to dictatorship and a more stable status quo, the risk for Iran will be overreach: prioritizing its interests while Iraqis long for a return to the way things were - even preferring Saddam Hussein to the current political scene.

President Trump's disinterest in the region only increases the likelihood that Iraq will experience revolution. This is not necessarily something which Trump would be against, provided that the leader which rises out of Iraq is anti-Iranian and against terrorism.

Saudi Arabia's soft power will be indispensable for the future of Iraq. Trump and Israel are likely urging that Saudi Arabia continue using its economic power for Iraq - once American sanctions take full effect on Iran, Saudi Arabia would become a more dominant player for the hearts and minds of domestic Iraq.

Though Saudi Arabia should be able to win over Iran in the economy war, the conservative kingdom may be unable to keep the post-revolutionary government of Iraq pro-American. As with Iran, there is much historical grievance for the United States from ordinary Iraqis.

The wild card here is Turkey. Will Turkey try and orchestrate a revolution in Iraq which oppresses the Kurds and the Shi'a? Possibly - but it would be highly unlikely to be an Islamic revolution - at least initially. The people of Iraq are currently more anti-theocratic than they have ever been. Yet given past strong relations between Saddam Hussein and Turkey, it is not hard to imagine that Turkey will lend significant financial influence to keep - and increase - the pro-Turkish nature of Iraq. In fact, Turkey is more likely to succeed in garnering a top ally out of Iraq post-revolution than even Saudi Arabia.

In the light of such events, it is more important now than ever that the United States keep its position in Afghanistan secure. The Iraq War - as with the Arab Spring - was an unnecessary diversion of resources from counter-terrorism in Afghanistan. The results have been an enormous increase in terrorism followed by a return to the status quo. Should Iraq follow the patterns in Egypt and Syria, it is essential that Afghanistan not return to their status quo - terrorism and the groundwork for 9-11.