Post Iraq War Iraq
Tuesday 27 November 2018
Iraq destined for chaos as country aligns more fully with Iran
Hopes and dreams across the world for a stable Iraq were dashed by a statement put out by the Iraqi government of refusal of compliance with Iranian sanctions.
The response from the United States is likely to be severe. This is likely to include sanctions being put on Iraq and, in the long term, may result in regime change in Iraq to benefit the United States and her regional allies.
What is certain, however, is the systemic corruption in Iraq is only set to continue, and Iran will continue to be blamed for it by the Iraqi people.
It is entirely possible that the United States will, under these circumstances, withdraw from Iraq completely and allow ISIS to rise again. It is entirely possible, too, that should ISIS again march on Baghdad, President Trump will not ally his government at all with the Iraqi government but rather ally with the Kurds and other Iraqi groups and let the corrupt Baghdad government fall.
Meaning: the US may allow ISIS to march on Baghdad to rid the country of Iranian influence.
In this scenario, Iran has the most to lose. America has already been largely forced out of Iraq, and the majority of the Iraqi people see the Americans as more of a stabilizing force than Iran. The Iranians, however, are viewed as occupiers, as the instigators of most of their woes and their troubles. This is shown by recent protests in Basra in particular.
This is a last-ditch effort by Iran to stop the United States from putting it under unilateral pressure. Iran has no desire to stop exporting its destabilizing ideology. Though Iran is not responsible for the creation of ISIS or Al-Qaeda, it is responsible for causing US allies to fund Al-Qaeda and ISIS as protection from Iran's ever-expanding influence. This happened, respectively, after the Iranian revolution and after the downfall of Saddam's government.
If the United States allows Iraq to remain this friendly towards Iran after being given so many other options - including reincorporation into the Arab world - then the Arabian Gulf will explode like a powder keg. Either way, the United States will be unable to maintain the status quo for long and, unfortunately for Iraq, it is better to let Iraq implode than the Arabian Gulf.
Saturday 15 September 2018
Iraqi parliament elects new speaker
Mohammed Al-Halbousi, previous governor of Anbar and 37 years old, has just been elected by the Iraqi parliament as the new speaker.
He was firstly chosen by the Sunni Arab coalition as their ideal candidate, but during the vote in parliament he was staunchly backed by the pro-Iranian factions within parliament.
https://www.france24.com/en/20180915-iraq-parliament-elects-pro-iran-list-candidate-speaker-0
The incumbent Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi has been weakened considerably following the protests in Basra against corruption, Iran and the Islamic Dawa party. Days later, the US-backed Prime Minister conceded that he is no longer seeking a second term. As a result, it seems the Saeroon coalition has abandoned Abadi for the Fatah coalition, which is closely allied to Iran. The Saeroon coalition scored the largest number of votes in the election this year, followed by Fatah and Abadi's Nasr coalition.
For the first time since 2006, the Islamic Dawa party may be out of power in Iraq. From 2006 until 2014 the notorious Nour Al-Maliki ruled Iraq, and it was his policies which led to the rise of ISIS. From 2014 until now, Haider Al-Abadi has been Prime Minister of Iraq. Initially, Saeroon was allied with Abadi, while Fatah was allied with Nouri Al-Maliki. To establish a coalition, the compromise between Saeroon and Fatah may have been the exclusion of both Abadi and Maliki from the next government.
However, the Fatah coalition is even more pro-Iran than Nouri al-Maliki was. Hadi Al-Ameri, leader of the Fatah coalition and the Badr Brigade, fought on Iran's side during the Iran-Iraq war. Should Saeroon side with Fatah, it will inevitably be stained by Iranian intervention in Iraq, meaning that, come next election, Saeroon will be forced to divorce from Fatah or face the wrath of further Iraqi protests.
Friday 10 August 2018
Why Hadi Al-Amiri as Prime Minister is perfect for the US
Following the Iraqi elections, Hadi Al-Amiri is the most pro-Iranian contestant for the position of Prime Minister. With Iran already overstretched and threatened in Iraq, Hadi Al-Amiri would provide the perfect face of Iran in Iraq - a rallying cry for the people of Iraq against foreign occupation.
The United States' standing in Iraq has improved - mainly due to their withdrawal in 2011 and subsequent invitation to intervene against ISIS in 2014. But should the United States interfere too much in Iraq, it risks alienating Iraqis as it during the occupation before 2011.
This alienation is all the more worrisome after the Iraqi elections in May this year. Haider Al-Abadi is vying to return as Prime Minister with US support, but he is faced with challenges from the Sairoon and Fateh Alliances, both which finished ahead of the Prime Minister's own Nasr Coalition.
The Fateh Alliance is headed by Hadi Al-Amiri, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces and the most pro-Iranian contestant for the position of Iraqi Prime Minister. The Sairoon Alliance, headed by anti-Iranian Cleric Muqtada As-Sadr, has threatened to pull out of any coalition that does not meet its demands, demands which rule out both Abadi and Amiri for Prime Minister.
The Sairoon Alliance is not only planning on pulling out of any coalition that does not meet its demands - it would also become the head of the opposition, an unheard of development in Iraqi politics. Usually every party in the political system holds down some positions in government - for there to be an opposition in parliament would provide a challenge to the ruling elites of Iraq unlike any before.
In light of this, it would be wiser for the United States to concede the position of Prime Minister to Hadi Al-Amiri. With an opposition in parliament and enormous protests on the streets, Iraq's political landscape is changing - for Abadi to remain the figurehead of everything wrong with Iraq would leave the United States without a credible partner in the future.
However, should Hadi Al-Amiri become the next Iraqi Prime Minister, the revolutionary fervor of Iraqis would spill out not only against the corrupt, ruling elite - which has ties to both America and Iran - but also against Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi itself, the culmination of Iran in Iraq. Though the revolution would be bloody, it would signal the end of Iranian dominance in Iraq and force Iraq to lean more pro-American and more pro-Arab.
Iran has tried to both dominate and humiliate Iraq through rampant instability, corruption and terrorism. With Iran more economically isolated than ever before, now is the time for the United States to allow Iran to commit to strategic overreach in Iraq, an overreach which would end in more failure than any other Iranian venture in the region.
Sunday 15 July 2018
Iran triggers its own protests in southern Iraq
The government of Iraq owes Iran over 1 billion dollars' debt in electricity bills. Following the implementation of the Trump Administration's sanctions, Iran cut its electricity supply into Iraq. What followed were explosive protests in Iraq.
The reason these protests were so explosive is because they come from Iraq's majority - the Shi'ite Arab community. And they started in Basra - a city very close to the Iranian border.
One reason suggested for the Iranian cut in electricity is that with such sanctions implemented against it, Iran feels it has no choice but to ask the Iraqi government to pay up, to keep Iran from recession. But there is another, additional reason suggested by pundits: Iran is hoping to destabilize Iraq so that Iraq cannot make up the shortfall of oil production, a shortfall created by US sanctions on Iran.
Such a move is a high risk gamble by the Iranian government which could see it lose considerable influence over Iraq. In fact, that already appears to be happening.
Though the Iraqi government and the paramilitary militias Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi are both very pro-Iranian, the average Iraqi - even the Shi'a - are not. Time and again most Iraqis feel that the Iranians are deliberately destabilizing their country as payback for the brutal Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's - which was started by Iraq. This is because though sharing a religious affiliation, ethnically Iraq and Iran are very different: Iraq is ruled by Arabs, Iran is ruled by Persians. With the United States no longer occupying their country, instead Iraqis are seeing Persian Iran as the unwelcome occupier.
There are Shi'ite Iraqi protesters who are calling for Iran to leave their country. Such rhetoric is excellent news for the current US Administration, Israel, Saudi Arabia and their regional partners. While in Syria it looks as if there will only be an Iranian withdrawal from the southwest of the country, in Iraq a complete Iranian withdrawal looks possible.
Should such protests continue, what follows in Iraq will be, likely, another war: this time between ordinary Iraqis and the pro-Iranian regimes that are established over them. Unlike the last war with ISIS, this war will be an intra-Shi'ite conflict between the Iraqis that are pro-Iran and those that are not.
Shi'ite cleric Muqtada As-Sadr - whose party won the last Iraqi elections - has said that he will not allow Iraq to be dragged into a conflict between US and Iranian interests. However, Iraqi protesters are seeing Muqtada As-Sadr with increasing irrelevance following his controversial alliance with Hadi Al-Ameri, head of the Hash'd As-Sha'bi militias and running second place in the elections. With widespread election fraud, it is increasingly apparent that Iraqis view the elections as illegitimate and Iran as ultimate benefactor in any corruption or fraud in the votes.
This puts additional strain on the United States, which has been tacitly using Iran to help curb the ISIS threat in Iraq. However this strain is likely to be temporary, as President Trump looks to Saudi Arabia to financially challenge Iranian influence in Iraq. Saudi Arabia should be able to buy stability in Iraq - after Iran is ousted.
However, the risks to Iraq after an Iranian pullout are enormous. Not only would it require the disbanding of the Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias; it would also likely collapse the current political structure in Iraq. Such collapse could lead to a coup - like the coup that got US enemy Saddam Hussein into power in the first place.
However, the difference between then and now is that since 2003 Iraq has become a much weaker country. A Saddam-like figure in Iraq would be forced to compromise with the United States, or risk Iran infiltrating into Iraq all over again.
Saturday 7 July 2018
Sadr allies with Amiri, risking revolution on the streets
The Iraqi people are weary of their incompetent and corrupt government - and they blame Iran and the United States.
Though the international community experienced an upsurge of optimism in the election of Muqtada As-Sadr - who ran an anti-Iran campaign - it is clear now to observers Iran still controls the country and still calls the shots.
Whether there were death threats to Sadr from Qasem Suleimani (head of Iran's elite Al-Quds force) or whether Sadr had been an Iran-backed candidate the entire time, the Iraqi people will not stand for another Iran-backed government that takes its resources, shores up its proxies in Syria and Lebanon and cares not a moment about the sufferings of ordinary Iraqis.
With other Arab countries returning to dictatorship and a more stable status quo, the risk for Iran will be overreach: prioritizing its interests while Iraqis long for a return to the way things were - even preferring Saddam Hussein to the current political scene.
President Trump's disinterest in the region only increases the likelihood that Iraq will experience revolution. This is not necessarily something which Trump would be against, provided that the leader which rises out of Iraq is anti-Iranian and against terrorism.
Saudi Arabia's soft power will be indispensable for the future of Iraq. Trump and Israel are likely urging that Saudi Arabia continue using its economic power for Iraq - once American sanctions take full effect on Iran, Saudi Arabia would become a more dominant player for the hearts and minds of domestic Iraq.
Though Saudi Arabia should be able to win over Iran in the economy war, the conservative kingdom may be unable to keep the post-revolutionary government of Iraq pro-American. As with Iran, there is much historical grievance for the United States from ordinary Iraqis.
The wild card here is Turkey. Will Turkey try and orchestrate a revolution in Iraq which oppresses the Kurds and the Shi'a? Possibly - but it would be highly unlikely to be an Islamic revolution - at least initially. The people of Iraq are currently more anti-theocratic than they have ever been. Yet given past strong relations between Saddam Hussein and Turkey, it is not hard to imagine that Turkey will lend significant financial influence to keep - and increase - the pro-Turkish nature of Iraq. In fact, Turkey is more likely to succeed in garnering a top ally out of Iraq post-revolution than even Saudi Arabia.
In the light of such events, it is more important now than ever that the United States keep its position in Afghanistan secure. The Iraq War - as with the Arab Spring - was an unnecessary diversion of resources from counter-terrorism in Afghanistan. The results have been an enormous increase in terrorism followed by a return to the status quo. Should Iraq follow the patterns in Egypt and Syria, it is essential that Afghanistan not return to their status quo - terrorism and the groundwork for 9-11.
Monday 29 January 2018
2003, the Iraq War and a Kurdish government
The Iraq War was an illegal intervention by the United States.
That there were no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons found in Iraq suggests that "weapons of mass destruction" may have been an excuse for regime change in the face of an unstable-looking Saudi Arabia. Had Saudi Arabia imploded without the Iraq War, the United States would have lost its monopoly on oil in the Arabian Gulf.
There are pundits who suggest that while the Iraq War was partly about oil, it was partly also about protecting the interests of Israel. But after Saddam's government was toppled, a pro-Iranian government took its place, leaving Benjamin Netanyahu more paranoid about Iran and Shi'ism than ever.
Neither Iraq nor America were ready for Iraqi democracy in 2003. It was only after the painful lessons learnt in 2014 - when ISIS invaded Iraq - that Iraq now has a chance for real democracy. In the aftermath of the ISIS invasion, however, the Shi'ite Arabs have an even stronger hold over Iraq: they militarily control Sunni Arab areas - without as of yet rebuilding their infrastructure - and the Shi'ites occupy the Kirkuk oil fields. The US wresting control of Iraq from Iran will be a project that will last decades.
The option of dysfunctional democracy, however, was not the only option for the United States in 2003. In 1991, after the Gulf War, during a debate about invading Iraq, Dick Cheney noted the following:
“[O]nce we'd … gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his government, then we'd have had to put another government in its place. What kind of government? Should it be a Sunni government or [Shiite] government or a Kurdish government or Ba'athist regime? Or maybe we want to bring in some of the Islamic fundamentalists?”
(At the time in 1991, Dick Cheney adamantly opposed any invasion of Iraq, and his reasoning was sound.)
In any case, installing democracy in Iraq fueled the instability in Syria, sparked the flames that ISIS later fanned and, to top it all off, gave Iran an important ally in its Shi'ite crescent. Could have the US installed an Iraqi government to benefit its interest more so than the government installed in 2003?
Yes. The US could have installed a Kurdish government.
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Sunni Arabs, a minority in Iraq, have controlled the unstable region with an iron fist. This idea of the ruling minority is not unique to Iraq: the Al-Assad family, though from the Alawite minority in Syria, rule over its Sunni Arab majority.
The Kurds have no homeland. The Sykes-Picot treaty ensures that the Kurds will remain a minority group stretched across Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran without a homeland for the foreseeable future. The only way to guarantee the creation of a state across traditional Kurdish lands would be to destroy the Turkish state and annex northern Iraq, Syria and western Iran. It is not going to happen.
But in 2003, the US forces could have catapulted Iraq's Kurdish minority into power at the expense of its Shi'ite majority and Sunni Arab minority. If such a government had been installed by the US, the Kurds would have reversed the policy of Arabization of traditional Kurdish lands, such as Hawija and Kirkuk. It would have been able to repopulate such areas by bringing in Kurds from Iran, Syria and Turkey - which would also have eased the Kurdish problem in those countries.
While short-term causing Iran and Syria headaches and greatly upsetting Turkey, in the long-term the Kurds would have been forced to move out of Syria, Iran and Turkey and into Iraq. Such immigration would have solidified Kurdish hold of Iraq, much like Shi'ite immigration today from Afghanistan and Pakistan has solidified Shi'ite control of Iraq.
Even had the US withdrawn from Iraq, ISIS would have never been able to take control of Mosul and never been able to genocide Iraq's Christian or Yazidi minorities. This is because Nineveh province and Mosul city would have been too close to Kurdish territory to be tolerated. But bloodletting between Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs would have been much worse, and the majority of the ISIS war would have been fought in the south of Iraq rather than the north. Many thousands more Shi'ite Arabs would have died in such a war which, while terrible, would have meant Iranian proxies in Iraq would have been weakened after the war on ISIS instead of strengthened.
A Kurdish-controlled Iraq would have not been entirely unpopular in the Arab world either. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations were terrified of Saddam's Iraq, and a Kurdish Iraq would have remained a block against Iran and posed no threat to Kuwait or any Gulf territory - only a threat to Iran, Turkey and Syria, none of whom are great allies of the Arabian Gulf.
Iraqi-Israeli relations would have been quiet for a considerable time period, as Saddam's Iraq was a champion of the Palestinian cause and, though Kurds champion the Israeli cause, too overt relations between Israel and Iraq would have created a terrorist epidemic among Iraqi Arabs unlike any seen thus far.
Baghdad would have become a city and province populated by Arabs and Kurds alike. Though initially seeing a surge of sectarian bloodshed, security from Kurdish forces would have been tight and would have forced Iranian and ISIS proxies out of Baghdad and into other areas.
The reason this option needs to be discussed is because any military action accomplished by a nation must be thought through with a careful and deliberate outcome for the day after. Perhaps it was essential to US interests for Iraq to be governed by a US-friendly government. But it was not essential to install a Shi'ite-dominated democracy into one of the most unstable countries on Earth, and one which was unable to protect its Christian and Yazidis from slaughter and genocide.
Though a minority, the Kurds would have had a better track record at protecting its Christian and Yazidi minorities and providing security for Iraq. They would have acted as a bulwark against Iran and been turned into a Kurdish country by Kurdish immigration from Syria, Turkey and Iran. Escalated violence between Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs would have been unavoidable, as it is in Iraq today, but as the violence receded, it would have been a far friendlier government in charge than the Iraqi government of today, and one more likely to protect US interests for the future.
The next time the US wages war on a Middle-East government, it must think very carefully about its policy for the day after. Or else terrorism will only grow and never recede as the US continues intervening in the Middle-East.
Sunday 17 December 2017
Israel's Iraqi solution to its Syrian problem
It is no secret that Israel is very unhappy with the peace process in Syria, backed largely by Iran and Russia.
Israel had hoped for regime change in Syria, due in no small part to the immense benefits it has received from regime change in Libya. Previous analysis can be found here:
http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com.au/2017/08/haftar-al-khalifa-and-israel.html
Syria has remained one of Palestine's staunchest allies and continues to give an Arab face to the Palestinian cause. Syria remains Iran's most important Arab ally and gives Hezbollah important support.
But in facing the reality of both Syria and Iraq, Israel is largely crippled by paranoia of Iran. This is understandable, given Iran's slogan and anthem being "death to America, death to Israel." Yet in the new Middle-East, it is imperative for Benyamin Netanyahu to look beyond the threat of Iran, and look to Iran's weakest ally: Iraq.
Unlike Syria after Russian intervention, Iraq is still beset with instability, corruption, chaos and terrorism. Despite the US-led military campaign against ISIS, sectarian strife continues, and sees little chance of abating.
Since 2003, neither America nor Iran have been able to stabilize Iraq. While improved Iraqi ties with Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia look promising in the short-term, the Gulf region is set for regional explosion and cannot be relied on long-term.
In the wake of defeat in Syria, Israel must seize this opportunity for improved, covert ties with Iraq. There are other Middle-East allies in the region who have covertly improved ties with Israel while keeping public ties hostile. Such a model should be adopted for improving Iraqi-Israeli ties.
Israel must not forget that most Iraqis who fought the Iranians were Shi'ites, and many Shi'ites see Iran's role in Iraq as detrimental to their security and stability. Israel should take advantage of this resentment to gain itself another Arab ally, one whose stability can help reduce the threat of terrorism regionally and globally.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)