Israel's Iraqi solution to its Syrian problem

It is no secret that Israel is very unhappy with the peace process in Syria, backed largely by Iran and Russia.

Israel had hoped for regime change in Syria, due in no small part to the immense benefits it has received from regime change in Libya. Previous analysis can be found here:

http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com.au/2017/08/haftar-al-khalifa-and-israel.html

Syria has remained one of Palestine's staunchest allies and continues to give an Arab face to the Palestinian cause. Syria remains Iran's most important Arab ally and gives Hezbollah important support.

But in facing the reality of both Syria and Iraq, Israel is largely crippled by paranoia of Iran. This is understandable, given Iran's slogan and anthem being "death to America, death to Israel." Yet in the new Middle-East, it is imperative for Benyamin Netanyahu to look beyond the threat of Iran, and look to Iran's weakest ally: Iraq.

Unlike Syria after Russian intervention, Iraq is still beset with instability, corruption, chaos and terrorism. Despite the US-led military campaign against ISIS, sectarian strife continues, and sees little chance of abating.

Since 2003, neither America nor Iran have been able to stabilize Iraq. While improved Iraqi ties with Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia look promising in the short-term, the Gulf region is set for regional explosion and cannot be relied on long-term.

In the wake of defeat in Syria, Israel must seize this opportunity for improved, covert ties with Iraq. There are other Middle-East allies in the region who have covertly improved ties with Israel while keeping public ties hostile. Such a model should be adopted for improving Iraqi-Israeli ties.

Israel must not forget that most Iraqis who fought the Iranians were Shi'ites, and many Shi'ites see Iran's role in Iraq as detrimental to their security and stability. Israel should take advantage of this resentment to gain itself another Arab ally, one whose stability can help reduce the threat of terrorism regionally and globally.

Iraqi Prime Minister continues to show political mastery

Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, has recently launched an anti-ISIS campaign into Hawija province. This shows that for the Iraqi Kurds, Abadi is a fearful adversary.

On the 25th of September, the Iraqi Kurds are voting in an independence referendum. It is no coincidence that Abadi has unleashed his forces against Hawija at this moment: Hawija is the Arab half of the Kirkuk province, and Kirkuk is disputed territory between Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds.

Haider Al-Abadi has shown an innate understanding of Iraqi and Arab politics. By striking at Hawija province now, he is sending a very clear message to the Kurds: if we can beat ISIS, we can beat you.

Whether the Kurdish question in Iraq remains merely a political dispute or escalates to a military one is uncertain. Abadi himself has threatened to use force if the referendum results in violence, which could be interpreted as either reactionary or as an excuse for military intervention. Either way, tensions between Baghdad and Erbil are reaching breaking point, and only a leader like Haider Al-Abadi has any hope of leading Iraq into a brighter future.

Mosul, Tal Afar, then Hawija

Iraqi Army forces successfully liberated Mosul over a month ago, freeing one of the largest Iraqi cities from ISIS' grip. Since then they have moved north-west to the city of Tal Afar, and have mostly liberated it with help from Hashd Ash-Sha'abi.

Next in sight is Hawija, the southern half of Kirkuk province. After dealing diplomatically with the difficult Turkmen area of Tal Afar, dealing with Hawija, an area heavily mixed between Arabs and Kurds, should prove less of a challenge.

After Hawija, the last territorial presence for ISIS will be in western Anbar province. Unfortunately for the Iraqi Army, the Syrian Arab Army is annihilating ISIS in eastern Syria, so it is likely ISIS' Syrian remnants will regroup in western Anbar province.

The last ISIS battle in Anbar province is likely to be bloody and long. And even after all Iraqi territories are liberated, the threat of ISIS to Iraq should not be underestimated.

Iran and Kurds greatest threat to Iraqi peace

Unlike Syria, Iraq's path to stability is not so straightforward.

Though ISIS has been driven out of its urban centres in Iraq, they still hold onto areas in Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar Province. Even should the Iraqi Army and affiliates crush ISIS from the region, there is every potential that ISIS may return. The trigger for an ISIS return is further conflict fueled by Iran and the Kurdish question.

September this year will see the Kurds vote for independence in a referendum. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, though pro-American, is anti-referendum and as such Kurdish independence would weaken his hand considerably. This could lead to a civil war between the Iraqi Kurds and the rest of Iraq, putting America in a difficult position, as both Iraq and the Kurds are US allies.

Unlike in Syria, Iran is a destabilizing factor in Iraq. With the Iraqi provincial and federal elections to take place in 2018, a new divide is emerging: on one side of the divide is the likes of Nouri Al-Maliki and Iranian-backed political parties and militias. On the other is Muqtada As-Sadr, Iyad Allawi and Haider Al-Abadi, who espouse Iraqi Nationalism and are more critical of Iran's role in the region. Yet both sides of this divide are Shi'ite.

With the establishment of Hash'd Ash-Sha'abi, or the Popular Mobilization forces, an intra Shi'ite war in Iraq is all the more likely, as many of the groups are fierce rivals and differ in how loyal they are to Iran or the Iraqi government. To strengthen his own hand, Abadi might unleash the Iranian-backed elements of Hashd Ash-Sha'abi on the Kurds, so that if the Kurds were victorious, Iran could be blamed and Abadi would remain Prime Minister.

In any case, Abadi and the Iraqi nationalists have support from certain groups that the Iranian-backed forces do not: the Iraqi Sunni Arabs and the US. Even should the Kurds break away from Iraq, the Iraqi nationalists are likely to prevail over the Iranian proxies, because the Sunni Arabs provide the additional weight needed and Trump is eyeing Iraq as the front line in the US' war on Iran.

But over the next 12 months, Haider Al-Abadi will have to tread carefully. His reputation has been made through defeating ISIS - how he handles the Kurds or Iran will determine his prominence in Iraq's future.

Can Abadi save Iraq?

Haider Al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq since 2014, had an enormous responsibility on his shoulders: destroy ISIS from Iraq. That task has been mostly completed, except in more sparse regions like Tal Afar, Hawija and Al-Qaim.

Yet still there is a risk of ISIS returning to Iraq. One only has to look back at 2006 to know that ISIS once existed in the Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar provinces under the name Islamic State of Iraq, previously known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Sound familiar?

ISIS has existed in Iraq, with different names, since the beginning of the Iraq War. It is a symptom of a persistent problem: Sunni Arabs felt under represented, and Shi'ite Arabs did not care for their Sunni Arab brothers. This fueled a toxic combination: one of Sunni Arab frustration but also of Shi'ite Arab indifference. This is why the Iraqi Army, largely Shi'ite, fled when ISIS invaded Sunni Arab Iraq in 2014.

But Haider Al-Abadi is not Nouri Al-Maliki. Nouri Al-Maliki was the previous Prime Minister of Iraq who fuelled sectarianism in the country deliberately, which can be seen from his rhetoric and policies. Abadi, however, is different: he is seeking to bring the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis together as one country and people.

Can Abadi stem the tide of an ISIS return? That will largely depend on how he handles the Sunni-Shi'ite Arab relations post-ISIS. His recent visit to Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab powerhouse, the first country on his Middle-East tour, is a good start. But his greatest challenge in the short-term will be negotiating a settlement with the Kurds in Kirkuk and Erbil - should the Kurds break away from Iraq, Abadi will be faced with an even bigger challenge: how to maintain credibility after losing Iraqi Kurdistan.

Another concern is the increased instability in the Gulf. ISIS may indeed rear its ugly head in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE, and, as it did from Syria, may seek to invade Iraq from the south. But Iraq will only be susceptible to another ISIS invasion if Abadi cannot unite Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis together under him.

Abadi's task is an enormous one. Should he succeed, Iraq's unimaginable suffering would lessen at last.

Saudi Arabia moving to support Iraq Kurds?

For further information:

http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/b341be09-9be6-4707-bdfb-dc4d7fd68ed4
http://abcnews.go.com/International/trumps-middle-east-trip-alienated-key-counterterror-ally/story?id=47584219

Iraqi President Fuad Massum, a Kurd, was invited to Saudi Arabia's conference against terrorism and Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, a Shi'ite Arab, was not. Now, since Qatar has been blockaded and Turkey has sided with the small Gulf state, Saudis have been taking to Twitter to side with the Iraqi Kurds in the upcoming referendum for independence.

Saudi moves against Qatar have caused Turkey to move to protect Qatar, which has caused the Saudis to support the Iraqi Kurds, because Turkey has a Kurdish problem.

Middle-East politics hardly gets more complex than that.

With ISIS being decimated in Syria and going back into hiding in Iraq; with the Syrian rebels largely holed up in Idlib and Dera'a; with the Yemeni quagmire having no end in sight; with the Qatar blockade unsuccessful due to Iranian and Turkish backing of Qatar, Saudi Arabia's ultimate revenge on all who have stopped its policies for the region would be in the funding and supporting of an independent Kurdistan, first in Iraq then in Syria against Bashar Al-Assad.

An independent Kurdistan across Syria and Iraq would weaken both nations - who largely owe allegiance to Iran - and would force Turkey and Iran to focus more on internal politics (against their Kurdish populations) over external. This, in Saudi's mind, would help them in their battles against Qatar and Yemen.

Unlike ISIS and the Syrian rebels, the Kurds are unlikely to be seen by the US as enemies. However, the Trump Administration has not completely endorsed Kurdish independence in Iraq at least. As for Syria, that is more difficult to tell.

In the Iraqi Kurdish Independence referendum, Trump has sided with the Iraqi government, saying the US would only support Kurdish independence if the Baghdad government agreed to it. But Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be so deterred as the US is, which bodes for an uncertain time ahead for the Middle-East. Will the Kurds break away from Syria and Iraq? Will Iran, Turkey and Qatar fund instability in the Gulf in response? These are all dangerous questions which will be answered in the coming months.

Egypt trading oil relations with Saudi for Iraq

Egypt is wrenching itself from Saudi Arabia's orbit.

Saudi Arabia still believes that Bashar Al-Assad, the dictator of Syria, must be removed for a settlement in Syria. However, most regional players now support Assad and do not want to see him removed - Egypt and Turkey are two prominent examples.

This policy has caused a sticking issue between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt's priority is stability and preventing terrorism from increasing, whereas Saudi's priority is curbing Iranian influence. In Syria, Iranian influence and stability collide.

As a result, Saudi suspended oil imports into Egypt for six months. And this has caused Egypt to look to Iraq for oil imports.

This is great news for Iraq and terrible news for Saudi. I have long since maintained that the world is going to look increasingly to Iraq for oil over and above Saudi Arabia, and that we are likely to see a reversal in stability and instability between the two countries depending on level of healthy oil exports.

As for Iraq, she really needs Egypt's alliance. Iraq desperately needs to have its military trained up, and the Egyptian army is a great example of what a powerful Arab military can look like. Egypt can buy Iraqi oil and in exchange assist Iraq with increasing counter terrorism capabilities.

I see that in the future, Egypt will have great relations with Arab nationalist countries like Syria and Iraq, as well as with smaller Arab countries like Jordan and Libya, and a smaller level of rapprochement with Iran, while Egyptian-Saudi relations will completely deteriorate.

This represents a realignment for Arab nationalist countries closer to Iraq than Saudi Arabia. While this is great news for stability in Iraq, this increases the likelihood of Saudi Arabia being vulnerable to economic crises and civil war, which also means more ISIS and more terrorism for the Arabian Gulf.