Mosul, Tal Afar, then Hawija

Iraqi Army forces successfully liberated Mosul over a month ago, freeing one of the largest Iraqi cities from ISIS' grip. Since then they have moved north-west to the city of Tal Afar, and have mostly liberated it with help from Hashd Ash-Sha'abi.

Next in sight is Hawija, the southern half of Kirkuk province. After dealing diplomatically with the difficult Turkmen area of Tal Afar, dealing with Hawija, an area heavily mixed between Arabs and Kurds, should prove less of a challenge.

After Hawija, the last territorial presence for ISIS will be in western Anbar province. Unfortunately for the Iraqi Army, the Syrian Arab Army is annihilating ISIS in eastern Syria, so it is likely ISIS' Syrian remnants will regroup in western Anbar province.

The last ISIS battle in Anbar province is likely to be bloody and long. And even after all Iraqi territories are liberated, the threat of ISIS to Iraq should not be underestimated.

Iran and Kurds greatest threat to Iraqi peace

Unlike Syria, Iraq's path to stability is not so straightforward.

Though ISIS has been driven out of its urban centres in Iraq, they still hold onto areas in Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar Province. Even should the Iraqi Army and affiliates crush ISIS from the region, there is every potential that ISIS may return. The trigger for an ISIS return is further conflict fueled by Iran and the Kurdish question.

September this year will see the Kurds vote for independence in a referendum. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, though pro-American, is anti-referendum and as such Kurdish independence would weaken his hand considerably. This could lead to a civil war between the Iraqi Kurds and the rest of Iraq, putting America in a difficult position, as both Iraq and the Kurds are US allies.

Unlike in Syria, Iran is a destabilizing factor in Iraq. With the Iraqi provincial and federal elections to take place in 2018, a new divide is emerging: on one side of the divide is the likes of Nouri Al-Maliki and Iranian-backed political parties and militias. On the other is Muqtada As-Sadr, Iyad Allawi and Haider Al-Abadi, who espouse Iraqi Nationalism and are more critical of Iran's role in the region. Yet both sides of this divide are Shi'ite.

With the establishment of Hash'd Ash-Sha'abi, or the Popular Mobilization forces, an intra Shi'ite war in Iraq is all the more likely, as many of the groups are fierce rivals and differ in how loyal they are to Iran or the Iraqi government. To strengthen his own hand, Abadi might unleash the Iranian-backed elements of Hashd Ash-Sha'abi on the Kurds, so that if the Kurds were victorious, Iran could be blamed and Abadi would remain Prime Minister.

In any case, Abadi and the Iraqi nationalists have support from certain groups that the Iranian-backed forces do not: the Iraqi Sunni Arabs and the US. Even should the Kurds break away from Iraq, the Iraqi nationalists are likely to prevail over the Iranian proxies, because the Sunni Arabs provide the additional weight needed and Trump is eyeing Iraq as the front line in the US' war on Iran.

But over the next 12 months, Haider Al-Abadi will have to tread carefully. His reputation has been made through defeating ISIS - how he handles the Kurds or Iran will determine his prominence in Iraq's future.

Can Abadi save Iraq?

Haider Al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq since 2014, had an enormous responsibility on his shoulders: destroy ISIS from Iraq. That task has been mostly completed, except in more sparse regions like Tal Afar, Hawija and Al-Qaim.

Yet still there is a risk of ISIS returning to Iraq. One only has to look back at 2006 to know that ISIS once existed in the Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar provinces under the name Islamic State of Iraq, previously known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Sound familiar?

ISIS has existed in Iraq, with different names, since the beginning of the Iraq War. It is a symptom of a persistent problem: Sunni Arabs felt under represented, and Shi'ite Arabs did not care for their Sunni Arab brothers. This fueled a toxic combination: one of Sunni Arab frustration but also of Shi'ite Arab indifference. This is why the Iraqi Army, largely Shi'ite, fled when ISIS invaded Sunni Arab Iraq in 2014.

But Haider Al-Abadi is not Nouri Al-Maliki. Nouri Al-Maliki was the previous Prime Minister of Iraq who fuelled sectarianism in the country deliberately, which can be seen from his rhetoric and policies. Abadi, however, is different: he is seeking to bring the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis together as one country and people.

Can Abadi stem the tide of an ISIS return? That will largely depend on how he handles the Sunni-Shi'ite Arab relations post-ISIS. His recent visit to Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab powerhouse, the first country on his Middle-East tour, is a good start. But his greatest challenge in the short-term will be negotiating a settlement with the Kurds in Kirkuk and Erbil - should the Kurds break away from Iraq, Abadi will be faced with an even bigger challenge: how to maintain credibility after losing Iraqi Kurdistan.

Another concern is the increased instability in the Gulf. ISIS may indeed rear its ugly head in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE, and, as it did from Syria, may seek to invade Iraq from the south. But Iraq will only be susceptible to another ISIS invasion if Abadi cannot unite Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis together under him.

Abadi's task is an enormous one. Should he succeed, Iraq's unimaginable suffering would lessen at last.

Saudi Arabia moving to support Iraq Kurds?

For further information:

http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/b341be09-9be6-4707-bdfb-dc4d7fd68ed4
http://abcnews.go.com/International/trumps-middle-east-trip-alienated-key-counterterror-ally/story?id=47584219

Iraqi President Fuad Massum, a Kurd, was invited to Saudi Arabia's conference against terrorism and Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, a Shi'ite Arab, was not. Now, since Qatar has been blockaded and Turkey has sided with the small Gulf state, Saudis have been taking to Twitter to side with the Iraqi Kurds in the upcoming referendum for independence.

Saudi moves against Qatar have caused Turkey to move to protect Qatar, which has caused the Saudis to support the Iraqi Kurds, because Turkey has a Kurdish problem.

Middle-East politics hardly gets more complex than that.

With ISIS being decimated in Syria and going back into hiding in Iraq; with the Syrian rebels largely holed up in Idlib and Dera'a; with the Yemeni quagmire having no end in sight; with the Qatar blockade unsuccessful due to Iranian and Turkish backing of Qatar, Saudi Arabia's ultimate revenge on all who have stopped its policies for the region would be in the funding and supporting of an independent Kurdistan, first in Iraq then in Syria against Bashar Al-Assad.

An independent Kurdistan across Syria and Iraq would weaken both nations - who largely owe allegiance to Iran - and would force Turkey and Iran to focus more on internal politics (against their Kurdish populations) over external. This, in Saudi's mind, would help them in their battles against Qatar and Yemen.

Unlike ISIS and the Syrian rebels, the Kurds are unlikely to be seen by the US as enemies. However, the Trump Administration has not completely endorsed Kurdish independence in Iraq at least. As for Syria, that is more difficult to tell.

In the Iraqi Kurdish Independence referendum, Trump has sided with the Iraqi government, saying the US would only support Kurdish independence if the Baghdad government agreed to it. But Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be so deterred as the US is, which bodes for an uncertain time ahead for the Middle-East. Will the Kurds break away from Syria and Iraq? Will Iran, Turkey and Qatar fund instability in the Gulf in response? These are all dangerous questions which will be answered in the coming months.

Egypt trading oil relations with Saudi for Iraq

Egypt is wrenching itself from Saudi Arabia's orbit.

Saudi Arabia still believes that Bashar Al-Assad, the dictator of Syria, must be removed for a settlement in Syria. However, most regional players now support Assad and do not want to see him removed - Egypt and Turkey are two prominent examples.

This policy has caused a sticking issue between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt's priority is stability and preventing terrorism from increasing, whereas Saudi's priority is curbing Iranian influence. In Syria, Iranian influence and stability collide.

As a result, Saudi suspended oil imports into Egypt for six months. And this has caused Egypt to look to Iraq for oil imports.

This is great news for Iraq and terrible news for Saudi. I have long since maintained that the world is going to look increasingly to Iraq for oil over and above Saudi Arabia, and that we are likely to see a reversal in stability and instability between the two countries depending on level of healthy oil exports.

As for Iraq, she really needs Egypt's alliance. Iraq desperately needs to have its military trained up, and the Egyptian army is a great example of what a powerful Arab military can look like. Egypt can buy Iraqi oil and in exchange assist Iraq with increasing counter terrorism capabilities.

I see that in the future, Egypt will have great relations with Arab nationalist countries like Syria and Iraq, as well as with smaller Arab countries like Jordan and Libya, and a smaller level of rapprochement with Iran, while Egyptian-Saudi relations will completely deteriorate.

This represents a realignment for Arab nationalist countries closer to Iraq than Saudi Arabia. While this is great news for stability in Iraq, this increases the likelihood of Saudi Arabia being vulnerable to economic crises and civil war, which also means more ISIS and more terrorism for the Arabian Gulf.

The Confederacy of Iraq

In my previous article on this blog, "The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum," I got some important facts incorrect regarding what is likely to transpire:

http://iraqwarjwaver.blogspot.com.au/2017/03/the-iraqi-kurdistan-independence.html

This article will reflect the latest data and correct previous errors made in the last post.

Trump has said that he would only agree to Kurdish secession if the Baghdad Government also agreed to it. The Abadi government, willing to compromise over Kirkuk (leaving it to a democratic election as for whether Kirkuk stays under the semi-autonomous Kurdish region or not) is unlikely to allow complete separation from Iraq.

However, Abadi is likely to allow the Kurds complete autonomy under the Baghdad government, akin to a confederacy. This would mean that Baghdad and Irbil would be 2 parts of the one confederacy - two independent states under the one state. This is the likely scenario which would also keep Iraq together.

The Iraqi Kurds, under this agreement, would be allowed to keep all of their resources for themselves. They would be allowed to hoist their flags up with the Iraqi flag. However, an attack on Baghdad-controlled Iraq would mean an attack on Irbil-controlled Iraq - i.e. Kurds would be forced to come to Abadi's aid, and vice-versa.

Would this lead to a Sunni-Shi'ite Arab breakup of Iraq? Unlikely. Neither the Shi'ites nor the Sunnis want to break the remains of Iraq up, not even into a confederacy.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum

The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum is dangerous for Iraq.

Iraqi Kurds are considering becoming independent of the rest of Iraq. Mistrusted by both Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis, the Kurds overwhelmingly see secession as a better option than remaining within Iraq.

If they held the referendum and voted to secede from the rest of Iraq, what would be the outcome? Some thoughts.

1) War between Iraq and the Kurds. The rest of Iraq, including Hashd Ash-Sha'abi, the Iraqi army and several Sunni Iraqi tribes, would wage war on the Kurds for trying to fracture their country. The war would be bloody, but it would likely result in Iraqi Kurdish victory. This would be especially true given that should the Iraqi Kurds vote to secede from Iraq, America would remain neutral in the war.

2) War between Syrian Kurds and Turkey. Turkey has been outraged by Obama's policy of funding the Syrian Kurds to defeat ISIS in northern Syria. Now the Kurds control enormous swathes of territory in Syria, including Kobane, the Arab region of Hasakeh and are not far from the city of Raqqa. This is the reason Turkey has now entered the Syrian Civil War on the side of Russia, Iran and Syria: they want the Syrian Kurdish threat to come to an end.

Trump is unlikely to continue this policy of using the Syrian Kurds to oust ISIS. Instead, Trump is likely to side with Turkey in ousting ISIS from Arab regions in Syria, then turn a blind eye to war between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey. The Turks would likely defeat the Kurds and potentially annex the Syrian Kurdish territory while allowing Bashar Al-Assad to remain President of the rest of Syria. This war would only increase in likelihood should the Kurds in Iraq secede.

3) Ayad Allawi coming to power. With the Kurds winning a war against the remnants of Iraq, the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis would be humiliated. They would likely overturn the status quo in the next elections, meaning that Haider Al-Abadi would no longer be President, the da'wa party would lose its popularity, and Iraq would be handed over to a mix of secular and militia Iraqis.

In the central and religiously mixed regions of Iraq, Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi'ite, would likely end up with overwhelming popularity. In the southern regions of Iraq, the Hashd Ash-Sha'bi 'heroes' would probably end up in charge, meaning two very different groups would be vying for political influence in Iraq.

However, Trump would likely support Ayad Allawi over the Shi'ite militias, putting Iraq back under dictatorship but under stability. Then Kurds would win in northern Iraq, dealing one blow to Iran, and secular Shi'ism would win in the rest of Iraq, dealing another blow to Iran.