Can Abadi save Iraq?

Haider Al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq since 2014, had an enormous responsibility on his shoulders: destroy ISIS from Iraq. That task has been mostly completed, except in more sparse regions like Tal Afar, Hawija and Al-Qaim.

Yet still there is a risk of ISIS returning to Iraq. One only has to look back at 2006 to know that ISIS once existed in the Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar provinces under the name Islamic State of Iraq, previously known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Sound familiar?

ISIS has existed in Iraq, with different names, since the beginning of the Iraq War. It is a symptom of a persistent problem: Sunni Arabs felt under represented, and Shi'ite Arabs did not care for their Sunni Arab brothers. This fueled a toxic combination: one of Sunni Arab frustration but also of Shi'ite Arab indifference. This is why the Iraqi Army, largely Shi'ite, fled when ISIS invaded Sunni Arab Iraq in 2014.

But Haider Al-Abadi is not Nouri Al-Maliki. Nouri Al-Maliki was the previous Prime Minister of Iraq who fuelled sectarianism in the country deliberately, which can be seen from his rhetoric and policies. Abadi, however, is different: he is seeking to bring the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis together as one country and people.

Can Abadi stem the tide of an ISIS return? That will largely depend on how he handles the Sunni-Shi'ite Arab relations post-ISIS. His recent visit to Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab powerhouse, the first country on his Middle-East tour, is a good start. But his greatest challenge in the short-term will be negotiating a settlement with the Kurds in Kirkuk and Erbil - should the Kurds break away from Iraq, Abadi will be faced with an even bigger challenge: how to maintain credibility after losing Iraqi Kurdistan.

Another concern is the increased instability in the Gulf. ISIS may indeed rear its ugly head in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE, and, as it did from Syria, may seek to invade Iraq from the south. But Iraq will only be susceptible to another ISIS invasion if Abadi cannot unite Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis together under him.

Abadi's task is an enormous one. Should he succeed, Iraq's unimaginable suffering would lessen at last.

Saudi Arabia moving to support Iraq Kurds?

For further information:

http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/b341be09-9be6-4707-bdfb-dc4d7fd68ed4
http://abcnews.go.com/International/trumps-middle-east-trip-alienated-key-counterterror-ally/story?id=47584219

Iraqi President Fuad Massum, a Kurd, was invited to Saudi Arabia's conference against terrorism and Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, a Shi'ite Arab, was not. Now, since Qatar has been blockaded and Turkey has sided with the small Gulf state, Saudis have been taking to Twitter to side with the Iraqi Kurds in the upcoming referendum for independence.

Saudi moves against Qatar have caused Turkey to move to protect Qatar, which has caused the Saudis to support the Iraqi Kurds, because Turkey has a Kurdish problem.

Middle-East politics hardly gets more complex than that.

With ISIS being decimated in Syria and going back into hiding in Iraq; with the Syrian rebels largely holed up in Idlib and Dera'a; with the Yemeni quagmire having no end in sight; with the Qatar blockade unsuccessful due to Iranian and Turkish backing of Qatar, Saudi Arabia's ultimate revenge on all who have stopped its policies for the region would be in the funding and supporting of an independent Kurdistan, first in Iraq then in Syria against Bashar Al-Assad.

An independent Kurdistan across Syria and Iraq would weaken both nations - who largely owe allegiance to Iran - and would force Turkey and Iran to focus more on internal politics (against their Kurdish populations) over external. This, in Saudi's mind, would help them in their battles against Qatar and Yemen.

Unlike ISIS and the Syrian rebels, the Kurds are unlikely to be seen by the US as enemies. However, the Trump Administration has not completely endorsed Kurdish independence in Iraq at least. As for Syria, that is more difficult to tell.

In the Iraqi Kurdish Independence referendum, Trump has sided with the Iraqi government, saying the US would only support Kurdish independence if the Baghdad government agreed to it. But Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be so deterred as the US is, which bodes for an uncertain time ahead for the Middle-East. Will the Kurds break away from Syria and Iraq? Will Iran, Turkey and Qatar fund instability in the Gulf in response? These are all dangerous questions which will be answered in the coming months.

Egypt trading oil relations with Saudi for Iraq

Egypt is wrenching itself from Saudi Arabia's orbit.

Saudi Arabia still believes that Bashar Al-Assad, the dictator of Syria, must be removed for a settlement in Syria. However, most regional players now support Assad and do not want to see him removed - Egypt and Turkey are two prominent examples.

This policy has caused a sticking issue between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt's priority is stability and preventing terrorism from increasing, whereas Saudi's priority is curbing Iranian influence. In Syria, Iranian influence and stability collide.

As a result, Saudi suspended oil imports into Egypt for six months. And this has caused Egypt to look to Iraq for oil imports.

This is great news for Iraq and terrible news for Saudi. I have long since maintained that the world is going to look increasingly to Iraq for oil over and above Saudi Arabia, and that we are likely to see a reversal in stability and instability between the two countries depending on level of healthy oil exports.

As for Iraq, she really needs Egypt's alliance. Iraq desperately needs to have its military trained up, and the Egyptian army is a great example of what a powerful Arab military can look like. Egypt can buy Iraqi oil and in exchange assist Iraq with increasing counter terrorism capabilities.

I see that in the future, Egypt will have great relations with Arab nationalist countries like Syria and Iraq, as well as with smaller Arab countries like Jordan and Libya, and a smaller level of rapprochement with Iran, while Egyptian-Saudi relations will completely deteriorate.

This represents a realignment for Arab nationalist countries closer to Iraq than Saudi Arabia. While this is great news for stability in Iraq, this increases the likelihood of Saudi Arabia being vulnerable to economic crises and civil war, which also means more ISIS and more terrorism for the Arabian Gulf.

The Confederacy of Iraq

In my previous article on this blog, "The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum," I got some important facts incorrect regarding what is likely to transpire:

http://iraqwarjwaver.blogspot.com.au/2017/03/the-iraqi-kurdistan-independence.html

This article will reflect the latest data and correct previous errors made in the last post.

Trump has said that he would only agree to Kurdish secession if the Baghdad Government also agreed to it. The Abadi government, willing to compromise over Kirkuk (leaving it to a democratic election as for whether Kirkuk stays under the semi-autonomous Kurdish region or not) is unlikely to allow complete separation from Iraq.

However, Abadi is likely to allow the Kurds complete autonomy under the Baghdad government, akin to a confederacy. This would mean that Baghdad and Irbil would be 2 parts of the one confederacy - two independent states under the one state. This is the likely scenario which would also keep Iraq together.

The Iraqi Kurds, under this agreement, would be allowed to keep all of their resources for themselves. They would be allowed to hoist their flags up with the Iraqi flag. However, an attack on Baghdad-controlled Iraq would mean an attack on Irbil-controlled Iraq - i.e. Kurds would be forced to come to Abadi's aid, and vice-versa.

Would this lead to a Sunni-Shi'ite Arab breakup of Iraq? Unlikely. Neither the Shi'ites nor the Sunnis want to break the remains of Iraq up, not even into a confederacy.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum

The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum is dangerous for Iraq.

Iraqi Kurds are considering becoming independent of the rest of Iraq. Mistrusted by both Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis, the Kurds overwhelmingly see secession as a better option than remaining within Iraq.

If they held the referendum and voted to secede from the rest of Iraq, what would be the outcome? Some thoughts.

1) War between Iraq and the Kurds. The rest of Iraq, including Hashd Ash-Sha'abi, the Iraqi army and several Sunni Iraqi tribes, would wage war on the Kurds for trying to fracture their country. The war would be bloody, but it would likely result in Iraqi Kurdish victory. This would be especially true given that should the Iraqi Kurds vote to secede from Iraq, America would remain neutral in the war.

2) War between Syrian Kurds and Turkey. Turkey has been outraged by Obama's policy of funding the Syrian Kurds to defeat ISIS in northern Syria. Now the Kurds control enormous swathes of territory in Syria, including Kobane, the Arab region of Hasakeh and are not far from the city of Raqqa. This is the reason Turkey has now entered the Syrian Civil War on the side of Russia, Iran and Syria: they want the Syrian Kurdish threat to come to an end.

Trump is unlikely to continue this policy of using the Syrian Kurds to oust ISIS. Instead, Trump is likely to side with Turkey in ousting ISIS from Arab regions in Syria, then turn a blind eye to war between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey. The Turks would likely defeat the Kurds and potentially annex the Syrian Kurdish territory while allowing Bashar Al-Assad to remain President of the rest of Syria. This war would only increase in likelihood should the Kurds in Iraq secede.

3) Ayad Allawi coming to power. With the Kurds winning a war against the remnants of Iraq, the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis would be humiliated. They would likely overturn the status quo in the next elections, meaning that Haider Al-Abadi would no longer be President, the da'wa party would lose its popularity, and Iraq would be handed over to a mix of secular and militia Iraqis.

In the central and religiously mixed regions of Iraq, Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi'ite, would likely end up with overwhelming popularity. In the southern regions of Iraq, the Hashd Ash-Sha'bi 'heroes' would probably end up in charge, meaning two very different groups would be vying for political influence in Iraq.

However, Trump would likely support Ayad Allawi over the Shi'ite militias, putting Iraq back under dictatorship but under stability. Then Kurds would win in northern Iraq, dealing one blow to Iran, and secular Shi'ism would win in the rest of Iraq, dealing another blow to Iran.

what does post-ISIS Iraq look like?

What does post-ISIS Iraq look like?

Make or break.

After the Mosul campaign, ISIS' hold on Iraq would severely lessen, but by no means would it end. On the one hand, ISIS still controls territory in Hawija - which is southern Kirkuk province, a traditionally Kurdish region which Saddam Hussein repopulated with Sunni Arabs - and western Anbar province, which borders Syria and Jordan.

Yet ISIS' hold on Iraq would still exist after being driven out of Hawija and western Anbar. How? Suicide bombings.

Between 2003 and 2010, there were over 1000 suicide bombings that occurred in Iraq. Since then many more have occurred, especially since ISIS invaded Iraq from Syria in 2014. Suicide bombings destabilize Sunni-Shi'ite relations enormously, as they usually are perpetrated by Sunnis on Shi'ites. They cause backlash by Shi'ites on Sunnis, which in turn leads to more suicide bombings.

ISIS are the masters of suicide bombings. The Iraqi government will need to work very hard on security measures to prevent suicide bombings from occurring in the country, especially in Baghdad, where the majority occur.

The trick will be for Sunni-Shi'ite Arab Iraqi relations to improve substantially. In this regard, Haider Al-Abadi, the current Prime Minister of Iraq, excels over his predecessor, Nouri Al-Maliki, who largely inflamed the tensions. This is more important than giving Sunni Arabs autonomy: instead of autonomy, unity and nationalism must be encouraged.

The other trick will be for Yazidis and Christians to have a prominent place in Iraq, particularly in Nineveh. While much is said about the Sunni Arabs, Shi'ite Arabs and Kurds needing to get along in Iraq, little is said about the oppression and persecution towards Iraqi minorities. This is not a phenomenon that came with ISIS; Christians and Yazidis have been seen as agents of America and the devil since the beginning of the Iraq War.

How extreme a Muslim community is depends on how they treat their minorities. If Abadi can make important steps towards enabling Christians and Yazidis to have a prominent political voice in northern Iraq, it will do much good for the region as a whole.

But perhaps the biggest threat for a post-ISIS Iraq is Iran. Iran has a heavy sway over the country, and unlike in Syria, Iran's role in Iraq is destabilizing and unhelpful. Should Abadi bring Sunni Arabs, Shi'ites, Christians and Yazidis together, then pro-Iranian Shi'ite militias will destabilize Iraq from the south in response.

Should the Iranian militias gain more sway over Iraq, ISIS will return and return stronger. Thankfully, unlike Obama, Donald Trump would not put up with Iranian militias destabilizing Iraq and likely respond accordingly.

But it must be an Iraqi response to Iranian militias to have a more lasting impact. Should Iraqis of all kinds turn on the Iranian backed Shi'ite militias - as is happening against previous Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki - then Iraq is more likely to come together, not break apart as would occur should America fight the Iranian-backed militias alone.

I for one am optimistic. Donald Trump is the right leader at the right time for Iraq. On the campaign trail, he has criticized the Iraq War many times, been honest about Iran's hold on Iraq, pledged to eradicate ISIS quickly from Iraq, vowed to up oil exports from Iraq, vowed to not forget the Middle-East Christians and has promised Haider Al-Abadi strong and firm support.

I expect Iraq to stabilize drastically by the end of Trump's time in office.

Trump likely to end Democracy in Iraq

Iraqi Democracy has been abysmal.

The level of corruption under the previous Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki was enormous. Haider Al-Abadi, while promising reform, is still a member of pro-Iranian Islamic Da'wa party which means that Iran's preference has always dominated Iraq's "democratic" preference.

To reinforce this Iranian preference is in all of the Shi'ite militias running rampant in Iraq's south. These militias make Iraq's south unsafe, and also undermine the democratic process by intimidation and threats to their own community.

In short, Iraqi democracy only benefits Iran.

Trump has been critical of the Iraq War for a wide variety of reasons. Chief among these is that Iran benefits from Iraq's current climate more than America. Trump has been critical of the rise of Sunni discontent through ISIS and equally critical of the lack of economic benefits for the United States from the venture, i.e. the oil. He has also been more recently critical of the lack of support by America for the Christian populations of the Middle-East.

With all this in mind, it seems that Trump is set to re-shake the balance in Iraq to stabilize it - i.e. Trump plans to end Democracy in Iraq.

To reinstall a dictator in Iraq is a complicated process. Firstly, Trump will do nothing until ISIS is defeated in Iraq. Secondly, it would be unlikely that Trump would install a Sunni dictator in Iraq, as many of the Iraqi Sunni Arab tribes would unleash their rage at the Shi'ite community to an unnecessary level.

Thirdly, it would be unlikely that Haider Al-Abadi or anyone from the Islamic Da'wa Party would control Iraq under a dictatorship. To do so would be to keep Iraq in the grip of Iran.

Fourthly, it would be unlikely that a Christian or a Yazidi would be the dictator in control of Iraq. Such policy would create too many internal enemies without strong enough allies.

The only two options I see would be either a Kurdish-dominated dictatorship or a secular Shi'ite like Ayad Allawi taking control. Each have advantages and disadvantages, and it is difficult to say which Trump would take.

But in either scenario, the threat of ISIS return would be greatly reduced. On the one hand, Ayad Allawi is immensely popular with Sunni Iraqi Arabs, and is a bridge between previous supporters of Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Shi'ites. He could heal the sectarian wounds of Iraq. On the other hand, Sunni Arabs would prefer being ruled by secular Sunni Iraqi Kurds than Shi'ite Iraqi Islamists.

However, though the threat of ISIS would be reduced, a new threat would emerge: a Shi'ite terrorist organisation in southern Iraq. Though Kurdish and Sunni Arab Iraq would likely stabilize under the new dictatorship, Shi'ite Iraq would become more unstable and less safe. However this benefits the Trump Administration more than hinders it, as they are able to claim lasting victory over ISIS and are merely fighting Iran, whose destabilization of Iraq caused ISIS in the first place.

With Trump reshaping Iraq for stability and not for democracy, Iran would be weakened in the region, and America would be fighting a proxy war with Iran in Iraq.

In stark contrast, Hillary Clinton believed in weakening Iran by overthrowing Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, which would have had disastrous consequences for the region. Had Hillary Clinton succeeded in overthrowing the Syrian government, it would have resulted in instability so far unparalleled in the Middle-East: genocides of Christians, Alawites and Druze would have occurred, and Syrian Sunnis would have fought with Israel on the Syrian-Israeli border under ISIS and Al-Qaeda. That is to say nothing of the spillover of instability into Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Rather than weakening Iran by destabilizing more countries, Trump has chosen the more logical conclusion: stop destabilizing Syria and stabilize Iraq by ridding it of Iranian influence. To do this would be difficult, but is likely to have a lasting impact on stability for the entire Middle-East.