Iran and Kurds greatest threat to Iraqi peace

Unlike Syria, Iraq's path to stability is not so straightforward.

Though ISIS has been driven out of its urban centres in Iraq, they still hold onto areas in Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar Province. Even should the Iraqi Army and affiliates crush ISIS from the region, there is every potential that ISIS may return. The trigger for an ISIS return is further conflict fueled by Iran and the Kurdish question.

September this year will see the Kurds vote for independence in a referendum. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, though pro-American, is anti-referendum and as such Kurdish independence would weaken his hand considerably. This could lead to a civil war between the Iraqi Kurds and the rest of Iraq, putting America in a difficult position, as both Iraq and the Kurds are US allies.

Unlike in Syria, Iran is a destabilizing factor in Iraq. With the Iraqi provincial and federal elections to take place in 2018, a new divide is emerging: on one side of the divide is the likes of Nouri Al-Maliki and Iranian-backed political parties and militias. On the other is Muqtada As-Sadr, Iyad Allawi and Haider Al-Abadi, who espouse Iraqi Nationalism and are more critical of Iran's role in the region. Yet both sides of this divide are Shi'ite.

With the establishment of Hash'd Ash-Sha'abi, or the Popular Mobilization forces, an intra Shi'ite war in Iraq is all the more likely, as many of the groups are fierce rivals and differ in how loyal they are to Iran or the Iraqi government. To strengthen his own hand, Abadi might unleash the Iranian-backed elements of Hashd Ash-Sha'abi on the Kurds, so that if the Kurds were victorious, Iran could be blamed and Abadi would remain Prime Minister.

In any case, Abadi and the Iraqi nationalists have support from certain groups that the Iranian-backed forces do not: the Iraqi Sunni Arabs and the US. Even should the Kurds break away from Iraq, the Iraqi nationalists are likely to prevail over the Iranian proxies, because the Sunni Arabs provide the additional weight needed and Trump is eyeing Iraq as the front line in the US' war on Iran.

But over the next 12 months, Haider Al-Abadi will have to tread carefully. His reputation has been made through defeating ISIS - how he handles the Kurds or Iran will determine his prominence in Iraq's future.

Can Abadi save Iraq?

Haider Al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq since 2014, had an enormous responsibility on his shoulders: destroy ISIS from Iraq. That task has been mostly completed, except in more sparse regions like Tal Afar, Hawija and Al-Qaim.

Yet still there is a risk of ISIS returning to Iraq. One only has to look back at 2006 to know that ISIS once existed in the Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar provinces under the name Islamic State of Iraq, previously known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Sound familiar?

ISIS has existed in Iraq, with different names, since the beginning of the Iraq War. It is a symptom of a persistent problem: Sunni Arabs felt under represented, and Shi'ite Arabs did not care for their Sunni Arab brothers. This fueled a toxic combination: one of Sunni Arab frustration but also of Shi'ite Arab indifference. This is why the Iraqi Army, largely Shi'ite, fled when ISIS invaded Sunni Arab Iraq in 2014.

But Haider Al-Abadi is not Nouri Al-Maliki. Nouri Al-Maliki was the previous Prime Minister of Iraq who fuelled sectarianism in the country deliberately, which can be seen from his rhetoric and policies. Abadi, however, is different: he is seeking to bring the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Iraqis together as one country and people.

Can Abadi stem the tide of an ISIS return? That will largely depend on how he handles the Sunni-Shi'ite Arab relations post-ISIS. His recent visit to Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab powerhouse, the first country on his Middle-East tour, is a good start. But his greatest challenge in the short-term will be negotiating a settlement with the Kurds in Kirkuk and Erbil - should the Kurds break away from Iraq, Abadi will be faced with an even bigger challenge: how to maintain credibility after losing Iraqi Kurdistan.

Another concern is the increased instability in the Gulf. ISIS may indeed rear its ugly head in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE, and, as it did from Syria, may seek to invade Iraq from the south. But Iraq will only be susceptible to another ISIS invasion if Abadi cannot unite Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis together under him.

Abadi's task is an enormous one. Should he succeed, Iraq's unimaginable suffering would lessen at last.